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LIST O:F PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
All parties to this appeal are identified in the caption on appeal. There is a
companion appeal for a co-defendant tried in the same uial, State of 1 Jtah v. Allen

Bnmn, Case No. 20140295. The alleged victims in the case, who are the payees on
the challenged restitution order, are Kerry R. Posey and Bobbie Posey.
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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code § 78A-4l 03(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Four issues are presented challenging the convictions themselves. A fifth
~

issue is raised regarding the trial court's interpretation of Utah's restitution statute.

Issues relating to the conviction
ISSUE I: The defendant was a manager of a Utah limited liability company
(LLC). By law, the authority of an LLC manager is prescribed by the LLC's written
Operating Agreement and the LLC Act, interpretation of which are questions of law.
The trial court ruled that interpretation of an operating agreement is a question for the
jury in a criminal case. The court also permitted the jury to give the operating
agreement whatever weight it wished in determining the manager's authority, and did
not instruct the jury on contract interpretation or the LLC Act. The question for
v;

review is whether a new trial should be granted due to these errors.

Standard of Review: The interpretation of a contract is a question of
law reviewed for correctness, as is the interpretation of case law and of a statute. Salt

Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, ,I 19, 258 P.3d 539. If the
Court is required to find manifest injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of
counsel on this issue, those issues are reviewed de nova. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT
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15,

,r

11, 328 P.3d 841; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,

,r

11, 10 P.3d 346; State v.

Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,r 4, 46 P.3d 230; Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e).
Preservation:

Didericksen's contention that interpretation of the

LLC's operating agreement was an issue of law for the court was preserved. (E.g.,
R.1515, p. 4:4-23; R.1521, pp. 194-195:22-6; R. 984; R.1382; R.1443.)

Trial

counsel did not specifically request the court to interpret the LLC Act. However,
such a request would have been similar to the request to construe the LLC' s
operating agreement and would have been futile in light of the court's rulings on the
latter.

Additionally, the issue can be reached under the doctrines of manifest

injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74, ,I 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,r 4, 46 P.3d 230; Utah R. Crim. P.
19(e).
Trial counsel did not object to the court's failure to instruct the jury on any
principles of law relating to contract interpretation or Utah's LLC Act. Counsel
averred that he did not request contract-related instructions because he believed
that an agreement had been reached with the State that the Operating Agreement
would be interpreted by the court as a matter of law post-verdict. (R.1383.) As
discussed below, either counsel's belief was unreasonable or the State unfairly
induced counsel's reliance. Either way, the jury instructions can be reached under
the doctrines of manifest injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel.

2
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State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,r 4, 46
~

P.3d 230; Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e).

ISSUE II:
the LLC.

The alleged victims had (at most) a 25 percent profits interest in

The remaining interest belonged to Didericksen and his co-defendant

Bruun. The "value" of property under the theft statute is limited to the victim's legal
interest in the property. The trial court allowed the State to charge 100 percent of the
face value of the 12 checks at issue, rather than the victims' 25 percent. Had the trial
court correctly applied the law, all but four of the counts would have been chargeable
only as misdemeanors and therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The issue on
appeal is whether those counts should have been dismissed as a matter of law.

Standard of review: This issue involves interpretation of a statute (i.e.,
the theft statute), and of a written, integrated Operating Agreement.

Both are

questions of law. (See cases cited in Issue I.) If the Court is required to find manifest
injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue, those issues
are reviewed de nova. (See cases cited in Issue I.)

Preservation: Didericksen's contention that the value of the property
allegedly stolen was limited to the alleged victims' interest in the property, and that
all but four of the theft counts were therefore chargeable only as misdemeanors, was
preserved. (R.163-164; R. 233-235; R. 985; R.1514, p. 12:2-18; R.1515, pp. 4-5:4-3,
vQ

andpp.12-13:21-3; R.1523,pp.178-180.)

~

3
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Because the lower court ruled against Didericksen on these threshold legal
issues and allowed the State to pursue the counts as felonies, there was no procedural
opportunity, and it would have been futile, to seek dismissal of the charges under the
two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors. Given this procedural background,
the statute of limitations was adequately preserved. If it were not, however, the
failure to raise a valid statute of limitations defense could be reviewed under the
doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel or manifest injustice. State v. McCloud,
2005 UT App 466, ,r 5, 126 P.3d 775, cert. denied, 133 P.3d 437 (Utah 2006).
ISSUE ill: By statute, wrongful appropriation is a lesser-included offense of

theft. The jury was not instructed on wrongful appropriation, and it was not included
on the verdict form. The issue for review is whether the defendant should receive a
new trial because the court failed to instruct the jury as to this lesser included offense.
Standard of review:

Claims of erroneous jury instructions present

questions of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ,I 16, 243 P.3d
1250; State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). If the Court is
required to find manifest injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel on
this issue, those issues are reviewed de nova. (See cases cited in Issue I.)
Preservation: Trial counsel did not object to the court's failure to

instruct on wrongful appropriation.

However, as discussed below (pp. 44-47),

counsel forwent such instruction pursuant to what he believed was an agreement with

4
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the State. Apart from whether the State unfairly induced reliance by trial counsel, the
jury instructions and verdict form can be reached under the doctrines of manifest
injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74, ,I 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ,I 4, 46 P.3d 230; Utah R. Crim. P.
19(e).

ISSUE IV: The defendant was convicted of a violation of the Utah Pattern of
Unlawful Activity Act, which requires that the predicate offenses occur over a
"substantial period of time."
A. The trial court did not instruct the jury that the activities must have
occurred over a substantial period of time. Additionally, as a matter of law the period
of time alleged in the Information was insufficient to satisfy that element. The issue
on appeal is whether the case should be reversed with direction to dismiss the
UPUAA count due to an insufficient period of time, or whether defendant should be
granted a new trial due to the deficient jury instructions.
B. If the convictions are reversed due to the failure to instruct on the
lesser included offense of wrongful appropriation (see Issue III), the issue on appeal
is whether the defendant should receive a new trial on the UPUAA count because
wrongful appropriation is not a predicate offense under the Act.

Standard of review: Claims of erroneous jury instructions present
questions of law reviewed for correctness. See cases cited in Issue III. If the Court is
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required to find manifest injustice, plain error, or ineffective assistance of counsel on
this issue, those issues are reviewed de nova. See cases cited in Issue I.
Preservation: Trial counsel did not object to the trial court's failure to

instruct the jury on the element of substantial period of time, or move the court to
dismiss the UPUAA count due to insufficiency of the period alleged. However,
failure to give an elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice
standard under Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) and constitutes reversible error as a matter of
law. State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). These issues can
also be reached under the doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel or plain error.
See pp. 52-53, infra.
Issue relating to restitution

ISSUE V: The trial court ordered Didericksen to pay restitution to the Poseys
of$189,574.33. (R.1377.) This amount represented the total face amount of the 12
checks for which Didericksen was convicted of theft.
a)

Prior to charges being filed, the Poseys had accepted full

compensation for all potential claims relating to those checks. The issue for review is
whether the trial co~ was required to take into account compensation previously
received by the victims when determining complete or court-ordered restitution.
b)

Restitution cannot exceed the victim's actual damages caused by

the defendant's actions for which the defendant was convicted. As described in Issue

6
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II, the maximum pecuniary loss caused to the Poseys from the alleged theft of LLC
funds was their 25% interest in those funds. The issue for review is whether the court
erred in interpreting the restitution statute as allowing restitution based on the face
~

value (100 percent) of the checks, rather than the Poseys' actual loss.

Standard of review: A trial court's interpretation of the restitution
~

statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Birkeland, 2011 UT
App 227, ,r 7,258 P.3d 662.

Preservation: This issue was preserved. See R.1077 and preservation
cites in Issue IL

Cumulative error
ISSUE VI: The final issue for review is whether the cumulative errors in the

case require reversal.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Utah Code §§ 48-2c-803 and -804 (LLC Act), 76-1-302 (Time limitations for
prosecution of offenses ... Commencement of prosecution), 76-6-404.5 (Wrongful
appropriation-penalties), 77-17-10 (Court to determine law), and 77-38a-102(6)
and 77-38a-302(1) and (2) (Restitution Criteria) are set forth in Addendum Exh. C.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature ofthe case, course ofproceedings, and disposition below

As described more fully below, the defendant Jrunes Didericksen (and a
second defendant, Allen Bruun) were managers of a limited liability company. The
alleged victims, Kerry R. Posey and Bobbie M. Posey, were members of the LLC.
The State charged Didericksen (and Bruun) with 28 counts of theft m
connection with 28 checks written by them from the LLC's bank account, plus one
count of a pattern of unlawful activity. (R.69.)
Prior to trial, the defendants filed various motions or objections asking the
court to interpret the written Operating Agreement under which the defendants
managed the LLC. (See, e.g., R.98-99, 101, 107-110, 113, 117, 163-164, 224-236.) 1
The trial court denied the motions, and the case proceeded to trial in
November 2013.

The defendants moved to dismiss at the end of the State's case in

chief, which motion was denied. (R.1535, pp. 178-181.) During trial, the State
voluntarily dismissed two counts. (R.1536, pp. 207-209.) Of the remaining counts,

1

The defendants also filed a motion for bill of particulars, asking that the State be
required to identify what portions of the Operating Agreement were allegedly
violated. (R.162-163.) The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the State was
not required to identify a legal theory. (R.1514 and id., p. 9:5-11 ("Well, don't you
generally look - if somebody says you're in violation of Title 76 don't you
generally look at what your client did and then you can kind of decide whether he
murdered somebody, or whether he took drugs, or whatever it was ... ?").)

8
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the jury found the defendants guilty on 12 counts of theft (2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 19, 21,
22, 24, and 28), and on the single Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act count (29).
(R.971-973.) The defendants filed a motion for new trial (R.1193), which was
~

denied. (R.14 73.)
The trial court sentenced the defendant to prison, but suspended the sentence
and ordered probation. As part of the probation, Didericksen was ordered to serve
one year in the Salt Lake County jail commencing forthwith. (R.1107.)
The court also ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the Poseys in the
amount of $189,574.33. (R.1377.) Didericksen separately appealed both the order of
restitution and the conviction. (R.1378; R.1475.) The restitution and conviction
appeals were consolidated by the Court into the above-captioned case.

Statement offacts
In 2007, a Utah limited liability company called Tivoli Properties, LLC, was
formed.

(Deft's Exh. 29, p. 20, and R.1534 (State stipulating to defendants'

exhibit).) The LLC was governed by a written Operating Agreement signed by all
three of the LLC's members: Equity Partners, LLC, ~anager/Member, Kerry R.
Posey, Member, and Bobbie M. Posey, Member. Id. For the Court's convenience, a
copy ofTivoli's Operating Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum Exh. D. 2

vJ)

~

2

The managing member, Equity Partners, LLC, had a single member, Four Winds
Development Group, LLC. Defendants Didericksen and Bruun were managing

9
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The Operating Agreement provided that Kerry and Bobbie Posey had a
combined sharing interest in Tivoli of 25 percent. The remaining 75 percent interest
belonged to Equity Partners (i.e., Didericksen and Bruun). (See Add. Exh. D, §§
1.2.12 ("'Membership Interest' or 'Interest' means a Member's percentage interest in
the Company, consisting of the Member's right to share in Profits, receive
distributions, participate in the Company's governance, approve the Company's acts,
participate in the designation and removal of a Manager, and receive information
pertaining to the Company's affairs.

The Membership Interests of the Initial

Members [Equity, Posey and Posey] are set forth in Article 3.3.") and § 3.3 ("[T]he
initial Sharing Ratio of Equity Partners is 75%, and the initial Sharing Ratio of Kerry
R. and Bobbie M. Posey is 12.5% each"). See also Utah Code§ 48-2c-906 (profits
of an LLC "shall be allocated among the members in the manner provided in the
operating agreement"). 3

members of Four Winds. (R. 84; State's Exh. 14 and 19.) As a result, Didericksen
and Bruun were the managers of both the Equity Partners and Tivoli LLCs.
3

In a later addendum, Equity and the Poseys agreed to a slight adjustment of their
capital accounts which reduced the Poseys' percentage to 23.8%. See Add. Exh.
D, Deft's Exh. 29. Because it is immaterial to resolution of the issues on appeal
and Section 3.3 of the operating agreement was not expressly amended in the
addendum, Didericksen uses the stated percentages from Section 3.3 (75/12.5/12.5)
herein.

10
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The funds in Tivoli's bank account came from a hard money loan taken out by
Equity Partners, personally guaranteed by Bruun and Didericksen. The loan was for
the purchase of 29 acres of land in Saratoga Springs owned by the Poseys, which
~

Equity bought from the Poseys. (R.1534, pp. 287-289:12-6.) Equity used the 29
acres as security for the hard money loan, and assigned its rights in the property to
Tivoli. Id.
From the hard money loan, a portion was used to pay off the underlying
mortgage on the purchased property, and the remainder was placed in Tivoli's bank
account. The State's investigator and expert witness confirmed that the funds were
placed in Tivoli' s account, that they were Tivoli' s money at that point, and that the
Poseys' interest in the funds at that point was in their capacity as members of the
Tivoli LLC. (R.1535, pp. 67-69:20-1.))4
Under the Operating Agreement, Tivoli agreed to pay the Poseys $10,000
monthly from the operating capital of the LLC. (Add. Exh. D, p. 5, § 3.1.1.)
Between December 21, 2007, and April 11, 2008, Didericksen signed 11
checks (~ong others) drawn from Tivoli' s bank account. One additional check was
signed on September 4, 2008, for $983.81. (State's Exh. 4 (checks) and R. 971-972

4

~

~

The State's theory throughout the case was that the money was obtained lawfully,
and then later misappropriated. (R. 86 (State's Memorandum of Probable Cause).)

11
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(verdict).) These are the checks for which the jury found Didericksen guilty of theft.

Id
The State contended, and the defendants agreed, that most of these disputed
checks went in some way toward development of a project called Hidden Acres,
which was being developed by an affiliated entity, Hidden Acres, LLC.

(E.g.,

Checks 1007 ("lot closing Hidden Acres Lot #2"), 1015 (dump fee), 1029
(landscaping), 1098 (dirt removal)5.)
With respect to the disputed checks, Kerry Posey and Bobbie Posey testified
that they were not asked about nor consented to the checks, that the defendants'

actions were contrary to oral discussions they had had with the defendants, and that
the use of the funds was contrary to the LLC purpose. (E.g., R.1554, pp. 147-148,
160, 163-167; R.1533, pp. 78-79, 85-86, 146-147, 160-163, and 227-228.)
Equity Partners (through Didericksen and Bruun) had executed a joint venture
agreement between Tivoli and Hidden Acres, LLC with respect to the Hidden Acres
development. (R.1535, p. 213:4-7.) While the Poseys acknowledged visiting the
Hidden Acres development site with the defendants multiple times (R.1520, pp. 3 839: 17-25; R.1533, pp. 135-136:3-8), they averred that they did not consent, and

5

Some of this construction work was performed by other companies of which Bruun
or Didericksen were principals. (E.g., State's Exh. 13, 15, 18 (U. S. General
Construction Group, LLC, Construction Advisers, LLC, Granite Builders, LLC,
Hidden Acres, LLC).)
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would not have consented, to Tivoli's entry into a joint venture on the Hidden Acres
project. (R.1520, p. 34:6-24.)
Provisions o/Lhe Tivoli Operating Agreement

The LLC's Operating Agreement began with a recitation of the members'
intent to "appoint a person or persons to assume responsibility for certain
management matters (the 'Manager')," and to "provide for the restriction on the
transfers of ownership interests in the Company ('Interests')[.]" (Add. Exh. D, p. 1.)
"Manager" was defined as "a Person, Persons or Committee, whether or not
consisting of a Member, Members or not, who is vested with authority to manage the
Company in accordance with Article VII." Id.,§ 1.2.10.
Article VII, in tum, provided:

7. I. Business of the Company. (a) Equity Partners, LLC ("EP") shall
have full, exclusive and complete authority and discretion in the management
and control of the business of the Company for the purposes stated herein and
shall make all decisions affecting the business of the Company. A[s] such, any
action taken shall constitute the act of, and serve to bind, the Company. EP
shall manage and control the affairs of the Company to the best of its ability
and shall use its best efforts to carry out the business of the Company and will
be compensated for providing various services ....
(Add. Exh. D, p. 12.)
The manager's authority was further described in Section 7.4, General Powers
of Managers, which included authority to:
7.4.l Purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire any real or personal
property; Sell, convey, mortgage, grant a security interest in, pledge, lease,
exchange, or otherwise dispose or encumber any real or personal property;
13
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7.4.2 Open one or more depository accounts and make deposits into,
and write checks and withdrawals against such accounts ... ;
7.4.7 Participate with others in partnerships, joint ventures, and other
associations and strategic alliances only where same are directly in pursuit of
the Business, as defined above.

(A<l<l. Exh. D, p. 13.)
Section 7.4.7.1 included a limitation on the manager's authority:
There is an express limitation on the nature of the Business and the powers
granted the Managers herein, the Company is intended to purchase and
develop, hold and sale [sicJ real estate for investment purposes only, and no
activities inconsistent with such limited purposes shall be undertaken.
(Add. Exh. D, p. 14.)
Article 9 .1 authorized Tivoli to make payments to affiliated entities:
Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement may be engaged to perform services
for the Company. The validity of any transaction, agreement or payment
involving the Company and any affiliates of the parties to this Agreement
otherwise permitted by the terms of this Agreement shall not be affected by
reason of the relationship between them and such Affiliates or the approval of
said transactions, agreement or payment.
(Add. Exh. D., p. 16.)
The Operating Agreement conferred authority on Tivoli' s managers to resolve
disputes in its interpretation.

See Add. Exh. D, p. 8, § 5.3.5 ("Any questions

regarding the conduct of the Company business shall be determined by a vote of
100% of the Managing Members of the Company.") and p. 18, § 12.6 ("In every
instance where agreement between the members does not exist with reference to the
policies to be followed by the company, the managing members shall have the right
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to decide what policy or policies shall be followed and the other member or members
shall consider the decision as final.").
The Operating Agreement contained an integration clause:
This Agreement embodies the entire understanding and agreement among the
parties concerning the Company and supersedes any and all prior negotiations,
understandings or agreements in regard thereto.
(Add. Exh. D, p. 19, § 12.10.)
Prior to trial, the defendants asked the trial court to interpret the Operating
Agreement, both with respect to its provisions regarding managers' authority and the
degree of the Poseys' interest in the LLC. (E.g., R.98, 99, 101, 107, 108, 109, 110,
113, 117, 163, 164, 224-236.)
The initial judge on the case (the Hon. Randall K. Skanchy) had previously
interpreted one portion of the Operating Agreement as a matter of law.
VJI

Judge

Skanchy had concluded that a section requiring "Members" to obtain consent for
expenditures exceeding $500 applied only to persons acting in their capacity as
members, not to "Managers." (R.146 n.1. )6

6

Judge Skanchy wrote: "The defendants make much of Mr. Posey's preliminary
hearing testimony that he believed each expenditure made by defendants over the
amount of $500 violated the Operating Agreement because that document limited
expenses over $500 unless by unanimous consent. In fact, the Operating
Agreement imposed that limitation only on 'members' of Tivoli Properties, such as
Mr. Posey and Ms. Posey, but it does not apply to managers such as the
defendants. The Court determines that Mr. Posey's testimony as to defendants'
breach of the Operating Agreement in this manner is not asserted by the State as a
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A successor judge (the Hon. Katie Bernards-Goodman), however, ruled that
interpretation of the Operating Agreement was for the jury. The court accepted the
State's argument that interpretation of an LLC's operating agreement in a criminal
case is for the jury, not the court. (E.g., R.1514, p. 13:1-8 (Court: "This isn't a civil
case."); R.1535, p. 180:5-7 (Court: "[D]espite what percentages are written in the
contract, we are here talking about criminal matters."); id., p. 194:12-21 (State: "It's
up to the jury to decide what the operating agreement means. The jury's not bound
by this operating agreement.").) The Operating Agreement was given to jurors as an
exhibit to give whatever weight they thought it deserved. (R.1444.)
As a consequence, much of the trial was consumed with witnesses reading
aloud, and then offering their interpretations of, various language in the Operating
Agreement. (See, e.g., R.1533, pp. 147-151, 154-156, 158-161, 190-193, 207-213,
260, 265-266; R.1534, pp. 4-10, 49-51, 121-126, 220-222, 264-265, 279-282;
R.1535, pp. 70-71, 108-121, 125-137, 141-142, 146-148, 158-167, 176-177, 264271, 282-283, 299-301, 304-307, 314-315, 331-332.)
Under the court's ruling, the State was allowed to argue that the defendants
lacked authority because of alleged oral discussions that predated the signed
Operating Agreement. For example, the State elicited testimony from its expert that

basis for any of the theft charges. That Mr. Posey's legal conclusion may be
incorrect has no relation to the crimes charged." (R.146 n. l.)
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he had "investigated several cases where the stuff on paper doesn't necessarily match
the verbal agreement," and that he believed "[t]here had been verbal conversations
about what the deal was." (R.1534, p. 228:2-9, p. 234:6-18.)
The State and the Poseys also argued to the jury the very interpretation of
Tivoli's operating agreement that Judge Skanchy had already rejected, i.e., that the
consent of all members was required for all expenditures over $500. (E.g., R.1534,
p. 240:4-9, p. 241 :6-19, p. 246:4-22, pp. 248-249:20-7 (State's investigator
repeatedly testifying that "everyone should have agreed" to release funds).)
The State even asked its investigator whether, in his "experience when it
comes to interpreting contracts," witnesses in other trials commonly testify as to what
contract language means.

The witness replied, "Yes.

Almost in every case."

(R.1535, p. 158:4-14.)

The Information
A Criminal Information was filed in the Third District Court on May 9, 2011.
(R.l.) An Amended Information was filed on March 23, 2012. (R.69.) (Except
where otherwise noted, references to "the Information" herein are to the Amended
Information.)
The Information alleged that Didericksen had committed 10 counts of seconddegree felony theft, 11 counts of third-degree felony theft, 4 counts of class A
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misdemeanor theft, and 3 counts of class B misdemeanor theft, plus one count of
Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a second degree felony. (R.69.)
Each theft count stated that "the defendants obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another (Kerry and Bobbie Posey) with a purpose to
deprive them thereof" Each count identified a specific "check #" and a statement
that "the value of the property is or exceeds" a dollar amount depending on the
amount of the check. For example, Count 1 says it is based on "check #1006," which
was a check written on December 10, 2007, in the amount of $2,000.00. (See State's
Exh. 4, p. I.) Thus, for Count I the Information reads:
COUNT 1
THEFT
a third degree felony
From on or about December 2007, the defendants obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another (Kerry and
Bobbie Posey) with a purpose to deprive them thereof. The value of the
property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but is less than $5,000.00 (check
#1006). This is a violation of Utah Code § 76-6-404, a third degree
felony.

The checks found to be theft
A table of the 12 checks for which the jury found theft, their dates, their face
amounts, and those amounts reduced to the Poseys' 25 percent (with the resulting
degree of offense) is set forth here:

Check (count)

Face amount
of check

Date
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Check (count)
Count2
Check #1007

Date
12/21/2007

Face amount
of check
$31,506.85

Count3
Check #1012

1/7/2008

$5,300

Count4
Check #1015

1/15/2008

$4,080

Count5
Check #1016

1/04/2008

$4,500

Count 7
Check #1018

1/11/2008

$18,493.15

Count 8
Check #1019

1/9/2008

$100,000

Count 15
Check#l029

1/25/2008

$3,475

Count 19
Check #1041

2/15/2008

$4,015.52

Count 21
Check#1047

3/31/2008

$5,000

Count22
Check#1098

2/20/2008

$4,000

Count24
Check #1051

4/11/2008

$7,500

Count28
Check #1070

9/4/2008

$983.81

25% of face
amount
$7,876.71
(2nd degree
felony)
$1,325
(class A
misdemeanor)
$1,020
(class A
misdemeanor)
$1125
(class A
misdemeanor)
$4,623.29
(3rd degree
felony)
$25,000
(2nd degree
felony)
$868.75
(class A
misdemeanor)
$1,003.88
(class A
misdemeanor)
$1,250
(class A
misdemeanor)
$1,000
(class A
misdemeanor)
$1,875
(3rd degree
felony)
$245.95
(class B
misdemeanor)
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(See also R. 83 (State's summary of checks, dates, amounts, and payees); State's

Exh. 4 (checks); R. 900-951 Gury instructions specifying which checks are associated
with each count), and 971-973 (verdict).)
The defendants ' settlement with the Poseys

In November 2008, more than two years before any criminal charges were
filed, the Poseys entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release with Equity
Partners, Didericksen and Bruun. (R.294-305, attached hereto as Add. Exh. F.)
Pursuant to the settlement and release, Equity Partners signed over to the Poseys
the 29 acres in Saratoga Springs plus a $174,000 payment from UDOT for a small
parcel, and the Poseys paid Equity Partners $25,000.00. The Poseys released any
claims relating to the 28 checks that the Poseys were questioning. Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Liability for theft turns on whether the expenditures made were authorized.
In this case, a controlling statute (the Utah Limited Liability Company Act)
expressly authorized the alleged misconduct: Under the LLC Act, owners of twothirds or greater interests in an LLC can apply company resources to activities
outside the stated purposes of the company or the operating agreement, regardless
of allegedly contrary desires of minority owners. The defendants here owned at
least 75% of the profits interests of the LLC.
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controlling document (the LLC's Operating Agreement) also authorized the
defendants' alleged actions.
The LLC Act and Operating Agreement should have been interpreted as a
matter of law and applied by the trial court; at a minimum, the jury should have
been instructed as to their provisions and effect. To the extent the LLC Act was
not preserved below, this dispositive principle is reviewable under the doctrines of
ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and manifest injustice.
An additional error occurred when the trial court allowed the State to charge
100% of the value of the checks when the alleged victims had (at most) a 25%
interest in those funds under the Operating Agreement and statute. Had the court
correctly applied Utah law, the charged amounts would have dropped to
misdemeanor level and would have been barred by the statute of limitations as to
"

all but four counts.
A third error occurred with the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on a
lesser included offense. By statute, wrongful appropriation is a lesser included
offense of theft. The State's own argument to the jury supported a conviction of
wrongful appropriation rather than theft, which would have resulted in reduced
penalties and eliminated the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act count (because
wrongful appropriation is not a predicate act under UPUAA). This reversible error
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is reviewable under the doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error,
or manifest injustice.
In addition to the theft counts, Mr. Bruun was charged and convicted under
the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, which requires at least three predicate
offenses occurring over a "substantial period of time." The jury was not instructed
as to this required element. Additionally, although the Utah Supreme Court has
not determined the parameters of this element, other courts have overwhelmingly
held that less than one year does not meet this requirement. The checks at issue
were made over a four-month period (with one isolated check five months later),
which was insufficient as a matter of law. Moreover, had the jury been given the
opportunity to and found wrongful appropriation (instead of theft), these would not
be predicate offenses as defined under UPUAA. Either way the count should be
dismissed as a matter of law. These reversible errors are reviewable under the
doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and manifest injustice.
With respect to restitution, the trial court ordered Didericksen to pay the full
face amounts of the 12 checks for which he was convicted. By law, restitution
cannot exceed the (at most) 25% ownership interest the alleged victims had in the
funds.

Furthermore, the court erred in failing to consider amounts previously

received by the Poseys in compensation for the allegedly misappropriated funds.
This double recovery by the Poseys is reversible error.
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Finally, the cumulative effect of all of the above errors was to deprive
Didericksen of a trial and sentencing that was fair in either appearance or reality.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
INTERPRETATION OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY ACT AND THE
WRITTEN OPERATING AGREEMENT WERE QUESTIONS OF
LAW FOR THE COURT, AND AUTHORIZED DIDERICKSEN'S
ACTIONS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Didericksen was charged with multiple counts of theft of an LLC's property.

The State was thus required ~o establish, as a threshold element, that Didericksen's
use of the LLC' s property was "unauthorized." This question should never have
reached a jury because, as a matter of law, Didericksen's alleged actions were
expressly authorized by two sources that should have been interpreted, and applied,
by the trial court as a matter of law: 1) the Limited Liability Company Act, Utah
Code § 48-2c-100, et seq., and 2) the LLC's written Operating Agreement.

A.

Under the LLC Act, the defendants' alleged actions were
authorized as a matter of law because they owned more than twothirds of the profits interests in the LLC.

As noted above, Tivoli' s Operating Agreement expressly states that the
defendants' profit-sharing interest in Tivoli was 75 percent. See p. 10, supra. That
undisputed fact in itself precludes the criminal charges here.
The legislature wanted majority owners of LLCs to have considerable
flexibility in operating their companies, and provided accordingly. Under the Utah
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Limited Liability Company Act, owners of two-thirds or more of the sharing
interests in an LLC have extremely broad authority - even to take actions in
contravention to the operating agreement or the stated purpose of an LLC.
Utah Code § 48-2c-804(4) provides that "[N]o manager shall have authority
to do any act in contravention of the articles of organization or the operating

agreement, except as provided in Subsection 6(g).") (Emphasis added.) Under
Subsection 6(g) [48-2c-804(6)(g)J, "members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in
the company, and 2/3 of the managers shall be required for all matters described in
Subsection 48-2c-303(3)." 7
The latter subsection [48-2c-303(3)}, in tum, permits members holding twothirds of the profits interests in a company to "authoriz[e] a member or any other
person to do any act on behalf of the company that is not in the ordinary course of
the company's business, or business of the kind carried on by the company." § 482c-303(3).
Holders of a two-thirds or greater profits interest are further authorized to
"mak[e] a substantial change in the business purpose of the company[.]" § 48-2c7

Profits interest means that portion of the company's profits to be allocated to an
individual member. upon an allocation of profits. § 48-2c-l 02(20). The State's
expert acknowledged that the allocation of profits to the Poseys was 12.5% each
(R.1535, p. 167); see also § 48-2c-906 (profits and losses of an LLC "shall be
allocated among the members in the manner provided in the operating
agreement").
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803(3)(d). And they may "resolv[e] any dispute connected with the usual and
regular course of the company's business[,]" among other things, see § 48-2c803(3)(c), all in contravention of the Operating Agreement.
Under the plain language of the statute, the trial court's error is manifest. Put
simply, the court should have dismissed the counts from the inception. Because
the defendants undisputedly held a greater than two-thirds profits interest in Tivoli
as defined in the LLC Act, the court should have recognized that the defendants
had express statutory authority to enter into the joint venture and expend Tivoli
funds on the Hidden Acres development, regardless of any allegation that it was in
contravention of the Operating Agreement or not in the course of Tivoli' s regular
8
.
b usmess.

B.

The Operating Agreement authorized defendants' alleged actions
as a matter of law, and should have been interpreted by the court,
not the jury.

Didericksen' s alleged actions were also authorized as a matter of law by the
Operating Agreement.

Under the LLC Act, the adoption of an LLC's initial

operating agreement must be by "unanimous consent of the members." Utah Code
§ 48-2c-501. The reason for that is obvious: The manager of an LLC must be

~

"'

8

At a minimum, the jury should have been instructed as to these dispositive
provisions of the LLC Act.
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entitled to rely on a written document through which all members have conferred
certain authority.
Once an operating agreement is executed, that document is not simply one
piece of evidence that jurors may give "whatever weight" they choose. If the
Operating Agreement authorizes the manager to do certain things - for example, to
enter into joint ventures (Add. Exh. D, § 7.4.7) - then a disgruntled LLC minority
member cannot ask that such provisions be ignored. Alleged oral discussions or
understandings predating the signed Operating Agreement are legally irrelevant.
Indeed, such discussions were not even admissible here, because Tivoli' s
Operating Agreement was fully integrated.
An integrated agreement is "a writing or writings constituting a final

expression of one or more terms of an agreement."

Tangren, 2008 UT 20,

,r 12, 182 P.3d 326.

Tangren Family Trust v.

A contract is integrated if it contains a

clear integration clause, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible on the question of
integration. Id.,

,r,r 17, 19.

The Tivoli Operating Agreement has an integration clause. See p. 15, supra.
Under settled Utah law, therefore, evidence of prior oral communications or
understanding is not admissible to contradict the provisions of the agreement.

Tangren Family Trust, supra. Nonetheless, the trial court expressly allowed such
testimony. (E.g., R.1534, 11/8/13 Tr., p. 14:1-11 (State's expert testifying that,
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from the Posey's testimony, it was his opm1on that expenditures had to be
approved by all Tivoli members); id., pp. 39-40:20-5 ("[W]e look to the evidence
as were the transactions authorized or approved? Under the agreements, under the
vJP

representations, verbal and otherwise, under the understanding of the parties, were
those transactions authorized?") and pp. 49-50:23-8 (stating that his conclusion
that a majority of expenditures discussed were unauthorized was based "partly" on
the operating agreement, as well as "verbal, and email representations[.]").)
Once evidence of allegedly inconsistent oral communications, etc., 1s
excluded, all that should have been left was interpretation of the applicable
provisions of the Operating Agreement. Interpretation of a written document is a
question of law, Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, ,r 19,
258 P.3d 539, which means that it was a question for the court, not the jury. Utah

VP

Code§ 77-17-10(1) ("In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the
court[.]").
The State successfully argued below, however, that interpretation of the
Operating Agreement was for the jury for the sole reason that this is a criminal
case. According to the State, parties lose their right to have operating agreements
interpreted by a court if the party is charged criminally - in other words, the
greater the stake (loss of liberty), the fewer the rights. The State's argument, as the
State itself wrote, was this:
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The State filed theft charges under § 76-6-404 of the Utah Criminal Code.
Thus, this is obviously not a breach of contract action. The Operating
Agreement is merely one of several exhibits that the State introduced as
evidence to support the charges. The jurors heard extensive testimony
regarding the Operating Agreement, had ample opportunity to review it, and
give it whatever weight they thought it deserved. The defendants offer no
rule of evidence or any other legal authority holding that only the District
Court - instead of the jury - can interpret the Operating Agreement as an
item of evidence in a criminal action. As for the cases that the defendants
cite in their Supplemental Blief, they are all civil cases involving breach of
contract claims - not criminal theft allegations. In essence, the defendants
are confusing questions of evidence with questions of contract law.
(R.1444 (all emphasis in original).)
The State (and trial court) were simply wrong. Just as in civil cases, the
court is also required to decide questions of law in criminal cases. Utah Code §
77-17-10(1).

There is no "criminal case" exception to the concept that

interpretation of contracts is a question of law. In fact, this Court has interpreted
contracts as a matter of law for the very purpose of assessing whether a
defendant's use of property was (un)authorized for purposes of a theft conviction.
In State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the defendant sold
his house to a buyer through a private financing agreement. Under the written
agreement, the buyer was to pay the defendant, and the defendant would make
payments on the deeds of trust encumbering the house.

The contract did not

specifically state that the buyer's payments were to be used solely to make
payments on the deeds of trust; however, the defendant's requests that the buyer
pay him on time so that he would not become delinquent on the deeds of trust
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suggested that, in practice, the payments were being so applied. The defendant
was convicted of two counts of second-degree felony theft when he accepted two
payments from the buyer and did not apply them to the trust deeds.
This Court reversed. The defendant could be convicted of theft only if the
State showed "unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof," the court's analysis began. Id. at 818-819 (emphasis in
original). The State acknowledged that "the contract terms [were] not explicit"
that the defendant was obligated to pay money received from the buyer toward the
trust deeds. Id. at 819. The State sought to remedy that problem by arguing that
the buyer's subjective intent, coupled with the defendant's requests for timely
payment, demonstrated an obligation to remit the payment, i.e., that "he was not
authorized to do anything with [the buyer's] money but pass it along to the
~

lenders."
The Court rejected the State's attempt, interpreting the contract as a matter
of law. "[T]he terms of the contract underlying this transaction are unambigious
and create no express duty requiring [the defendant] to pay over the sums received
from [the buyer]," the Court concluded. Id. "We construe unambiguous contracts
as a matter of law and accord no deference to the trial court's ruling." Id. ( citing
civil contract cases). The Court went on:
The contract imposes an uncontroverted requirement that [the defendant]
pay [the trust deeds], but does not mention any requirement that [the
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defendant] apply [the buyer's] payments to the trust deeds, nor does the
contract limit [the defendant] to making payments only with funds received
from [the buyer] .... We find nothing in the language of the agreement which
requires [the defendant] to apply funds received from [the buyer] to the
Valley and First Security loans.

Id.
The Court noted that the case involved
the criminal prosecution of what is essentially a breach of a real estate sale
agreement. ... In that posture, we are loathe to give approval to the broad
construction of section 76-6-404 [the theft statute] urged upon us by the
state. Were we to do so, it is likely that memorials of commercial
transactions would soon be drafted to include boilerplate language designed
to impose criminal liability for interruptions in the stream of payments - a
circumstance which would normally be nothing more than a breach of
contract, traditionally viewed as adequately remedied through an action of
law.

Id. at 819; see also State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1167 n.6 (Utah 1980) ("A
theft conviction requires proof of the intent to illegally and permanently deprive
one of his property, not merely of a breach of the terms of a business agreement.").
The Court has similarly interpreted written agreements in other criminal
cases.

E.g., State v. Stringham, 957 P .2d 602, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

(reviewing terms of written agreement found to exist by the jury, noting that
"double-payment was not authorized by defendant's agreement with APA"); cf

State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 418 (rejecting claim of authority to use funds where
only written provision cited by defendant regarding authority was a general
nonrefundability clause in an earnest money agreement).

30

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As noted in Burton, it is a court's role to interpret unambiguous agreements
as a matter of law. The result would be the same, however, even if the trial court
had found the operating agreement to be ambiguous. To do so, the court would
L9

first have had to conclude that "it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other
facial deficiencies." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ,r 25, 190 P.3d 1269 (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
If a provision is ambiguous, the jury's role is to decide the parties' intent at

the time they adopted that specific provision.

The State did not argue that,

however, and the jury was not so instructed - most likely because it would have
Vi)

been fatal to the State's case: By definition, a finding of ambiguity would have
meant that the defendants' interpretation of their authority was reasonable.
More problematically for the State, the legislature has prescribed a specific
method for resolving ambiguities in operating agreements. Under the LLC Act,
'4P

the holders of two-thirds profits interests are expressly authorized to resolve
disputes regarding the conduct of the business. Utah Code § 48-2c-803(3)(c).
That broad provision, by its terms, would include disputes over which of two
reasonable interpretations of an operating agreement to follow. (Indeed, as noted,
the legislature has even authorized such super-majority interest holders to
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contravene operating agreements.) The Operating Agreement itself also confers
similar authority on Tivoli's managers. See pp. 14-15, supra.
In short, by statute and express written agreement, Equity Partners
(Didericksen and Bruun) had the authority to interpret or reconcile inconsistent
provisions or resolve ambiguities. If the Operating Agreement were ambiguous,
the State could not meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Operating Agreement did not authorize, for example, the Hidden Acres joint
venture. State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982) ("[T]he burden is on the state
to show unauthorized control, not on the defendant to show authorized control.")
(emphasis in original).
In sum, reversal and dismissal of all counts is compelled by both the LLC
Act and the Operating Agreement.

C.

Any of the foregoing issues not preserved should be reviewed for
ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and manifest
injustice.

The defendants argued below that the trial court was required to interpret the
Operating Agreement as a matter of law. Seep. 2, supra, Issue I Preservation.
That issue, accordingly, was fully preserved. If the Court concludes that the effect
of the LLC Act was not preserved, the Court should still reverse under the
doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, or manifest injustice.
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1.

Ineffective assistance of counsel.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show 1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and 2) that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.

State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70,

,r 18, 321

P.3d 1136. In this case, those elements

would be met.
As shown above, the LLC Act expressly authorizes the exact conduct of which
the defendants were accused, i.e., allegedly acting in contravention of an operating
agreement or changing or going outside the business of the company. See pp. 23-25,

supra. The Act also contains other provisions directly supportive of the defendant's
innocence in this case. See pp. 24-25, supra.
Didericksen's trial counsel did not mention this governing statute, however, let
alone ask the trial court to apply it or to instruct the jury in accordance with its
.;;;

provisions. Failing to discover or address a dispositive state statute is a deficiency
that falls well below any objective standard of care. See, e.g., State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT
49, ,r 38, 343 P.3d 1250. That this omission was prejudicial is shown above - among
other things, the statute affords a complete defense to all charges.
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2.

Plain error.

To show plain error, an appellant must show that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the

I

~

I

error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is hannful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, that confidence in the verdict is undermined." State

v. Bedell, 2014 UT I, ,r 20,322 P.3d 697. Those elements are, again, met here.
Didericksen has shown above that it was error not to apply governing
provisions of the LLC Act and that, but for that error, the counts would have been
dismissed. That error should have been obvious to the trial court: The entire issue
before the court was whether the managers of an LLC were authorized to use LLC
funds.

It should be obvious that LLC statutes would come into play. When a

dispositive issue is the subject of a clear statute, failure to apply that statute is plain
error.
Given that the statute is straightforward (not fact-intensive or complex) and
could not conceivably have been ignored on strategic grounds, it should have been
obvious to the court and parties below. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645
(2014) (citing State v. Gornick, 340 OR.160, 130 P.3d 780, 783 (2006) as
"identifying the following considerations as suggesting that an error is _'plain': that
the error is one of law; that it is 'obvious, not reasonably in dispute'; that it 'appears
on the face of the record,' meaning that the reviewing court does not need to 'go
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I~

outside the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences,'
such as a strategy of the parties; and that 'the facts constituting the error are
irrefutable')").
The prejudice from such error is also obvious: the convictions cannot stand,
and the jury would likely have reached a different result if instructed about the
~

statutory authority possessed by two-thirds profits holders.
3.

Manifest injustice.

Apart from the preceding two contentions, the govemmg LLC Act
provisions should be reached to prevent manifest injustice. A state statute directly
relates to, and exonerates, the defendant's alleged acts. The defendant has multiple
felony convictions on his record, has a large restitution judgment against him, and
his freedom will be constrained well into the next decade, all unnecessarily.

II.

ALL BUT FOUR COUNTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, OR
A NEW TRIAL GRANTED, BECAUSE THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN IS LIMITED TO THE
VICTIM'S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.
A.

The value of "property of another" is limited to the other's
interest-in the property.

The State acknowledged below that, under the law, a person cannot be
charged with stealing his own property. The State correctly noted, however, that
"[i]t is no defense ... that the actor has an interest in the property ... stolen if another
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ie,i

person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe[.]" Utah Code §
76-6-402(2).
As § 76-6-402(2) indicates on its face, the "infringement" ·(theft) is limited
to the extent of the other person's interest. More specifically, the value of the
property allegedly stolen is defined by, and limited to, the alleged victim's interest.
This rather obvious proposition has been settled in Utah for more than 70 years.
In State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626 (1943), the defendant took his
car to a mechanic for repairs.

By law, the mechanic had a statutory lien on

(interest in) the car to the extent of his unpaid services. Without having paid the
bill in full, the defendant took back his car, and was subsequently charged with
stealing the automobile from the garage owner.

He was charged with grand

larceny because the value of the automobile was more than $50.00.
The defendant argued that he could not be charged with stealing his own
property, i.e., a car that he owned. While agreeing with that proposition generally,
the Supreme Court held that it does not apply to the extent that another party - in
that case, the mechanic - has a legal interest in the property. Id. at 631. The
principal opinion ordered a new trial because, among other things, the jury was not
instructed on the nature of the garage owner's interest in the property. Id. at 630
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("Not one word in the instructions is said with reference to a bailor or bailee, to a
lienholder's rights, or to general or special property in a chattel .... ")9
Through concurring opinions, a majority of the justices made clear that the
~

value of the property stolen was not the value of the automobile, but only the
amount of the mechanic's legal interest. Chief Justice Wolfe wrote:
The opinion rightly states that at common law a bailor could steal his own
chattel from a bailee. What he stole was the special property of the bail or in
the chattel.. .. By the reasoning above, when the chattel possess a legal
attribute or property in respect to the bailee by which he can retain
possession for recourse, such attribute is a property of the whole chattel but
its value is as to the bailee only the amount of his indebtedness. Mr. Justice
McDonough has developed this matter according to the intent of the
legislature as discerned from the gradation of degrees of larceny. I agree
with his conclusions in this regard. The third question must therefore be
answered that if the jury found only $3 0 owning, the offense must be
considered a misdemeanor.

Id. at 631 (Wolfe, C.J., concurring).
Although the adequacy of jury instructions was not raised by the parties,
Chief Justice Wolfe concluded that "the lack of an instruction as to the amount of
v;

the indebtedness being the measure of grand or petty larceny may not be only an
inadequacy but be misleading." Id. at 632. "Since the first element in Instruction
No. 5 used the phrase 'did steal, take and carry away one automobile of the value
of more than fifty dollars' the jury's mind would naturally conclude that the value

~

~

9

"This case illustrates the misuse of the criminal machinery of the law m
attempting to enforce a civil obligation," the opinion noted. Id. at 626.
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of the car and not the special property of the complaining witness was the measure
of whether the offense was petty or grand larceny." Id. (emphasis in original).
Agreeing with Justice Wolfe's conclusion, Justice McDonough offered the
example of a mechanic who was owed $1 for material and labor on a bicycle worth
$50. If the bicycle's owner stole it from the mechanic, the crime would only be a
misdemeanor (i.e., below $50), he observed:
We must refer the degree of the offense to the assumed injury to the
owner.... It is true that if a thief who has no property rights therein, steals
property worth $100 from one who has merely the possession thereof, he is
guilty of grand larceny even though the one in possession was not even
rightfully in possession. However, in such case the thief deprives the true
owner of property of value $100. He likewise enriches himself to the same
extent. But we should not apply such rule so as to say that by stealing
property of $100 in value from a lienholder, the general owner is guilty of
grand larceny although he deprived the possessor of only $1 in value and
enriched himself but to the same extent. The value of the property taken, as
such words are used in the [statute] should be held to be but $1.

Id at 633; see also id. at 634 (Wade, J., concurring) ("I agree with Mr. Justice
McDonough that the value of the property stolen cannot exceed the amount of the
lien which the lienholder has against it at the time of taking.").
The jury was misled here in a manner similar to Parker. The specific
"property" charged by the State as having been stolen was 12 individual checks
written from Tivoli, LLC's bank account. See pp. 17-18, supra. Nonetheless, the
jury was instructed on the entire face value of the checks, rather than the 25
percent interest that (at most) the Poseys had under the written Operating

38

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Agreement.

Indeed, the jury received no instruction at all that the value was

limited to the Poseys' interest in the funds.
The State has the burden of proving the value of the property stolen. State v.
~

Forshee, 588 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1978); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659, 662
(Utah 1985); State v. Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P. 789, 790 (1917). 10 In response
to the inconvenient interest pcn;cntagcs to which the alleged victims had
themselves agreed, the State proffered two theories to justify claiming the full face
value of the checks. First, the State argued that the Poseys had "a contractual
right" to receive $750,000 from Tivoli for the purchase of the property, and that
"the 25% interest the Poseys had (12.5% each) was in Tivoli's profits after they
were paid the remaining $2. 7 5 million of the purchase price due to them. The
Poseys were due the $2.75 million before Equity Pa11ners received any profits
from Tivoli. Thus, while the money deposited into Tivoli's account may have
been designated for Tivoli, the Poseys maintained a complete interest in it until
they were paid the remaining $2. 75 million in full."

(R.144 7 (emphasis in

original).)

10

~

~

This requirement is particularly critical "when the value alleged is close to the
line dividing one offense from another." State v. Larsen, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (vacating felony conviction where the State's evidence was of the
original purchase price of the stolen property rather than the value at the time of
the theft).
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The State's own argument was self-defeating: as the State acknowledged,
the claim to money relating to purchase of the property was "a contractual right" to

receive the remaining purchase price - in other words, the Poseys were ordinary
creditors of Tivoli with respect to that sale. The State cited no authority for the

proposition that someone who allegedly steals from an entity may be charged with
the full amount of creditors' unsecured claims against that entity. Nor was the
State's argument supported by the theft statute, which bars even such a contention
with respect to secured claims. See Utah Code § 76-6-402(2) (under theft statute,
"an interest in property for purposes of this subsection shall not include a security
interest for the repayment of a debt or obligation.").
The State tried a different tack in its closing argument, telling the jury that
the value of the property at issue was $3.5 million. (R.1538, p. 17:13-25.) That
was based on a wholly improper argument that the "property" was the 29 acres of
land purchased by Equity Partners and assigned to Tivoli - something that was
neither alleged in the Information nor in the Jury Instructions, which expressly
defined the "property" stolen as the 12 checks. (R.69-77; R. 900-951.)
Apart from the failure to charge the defendants with theft of real estate rather
than the checks, the State's new theory was baseless under the LLC Act. Even
when an LLC owns real property, by statute a member's interest is personal
property regardless of the nature of the property owned by the company. Utah

40

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Code § 48-2c-701(1). Members have no interest in, or claim to, specific assets
held by an LLC. Id. § 48-2c-701 (2). The State had no basis whatsoever for
claiming that the value of the checks charged was the value of a piece of real
property owned by the LLC.
In short: The defendants were charged with misusing an LLC's funds by
writing some unauthorized checks from the LLC's bank account. The defendants
owned all but 25 percent of the allegedly stolen LLC funds. As a matter of law,
the value of the allegedly stolen property was no more than 25 percent of the
checks at issue. The jury should have been instructed accordingly, and reversal is
compelled on that ground alone.
B.

Correctly applying the law, all but four counts should be
dismissed as time barred.

As Didericksen's trial counsel repeatedly advised the trial court, limiting the
value of the checks to the Poseys' 25% interest would have dropped all but four
counts (2, 7, 8, and 24) below the felony threshold. (See Table, p. 19, supra.) Had
the State amended its Information accordingly, the resulting misdemeanors would
then have been subject to dismissal based upon the two-year statute of limitations.
Utah Code§ 76-1-302(1)(b).
The State bears the burden of proving that a criminal action is not barred by
vii

the statute of limitations. State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
It would have no argument here, particularly where the Poseys brought their
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complaints to the State well within the statute of limitations period even for
misdemeanors. (R.1520, p. 31:15-24.) 11
Independent of all other issues on appeal, the court should reverse
Didericksen' s convictions and remand with instructions to dismiss all but Counts
2, 7, 8, and 24 as time barred.

III.

THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO
INSTRUCT ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION.
A.

The jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense
of wrongful appropriation.

By statute, and as acknowledged by the State, "[w]rongful appropriation is a
lesser included offense of theft.
(R.86.)

See § 76-6-404.5(4), Utah Code Annotated."

"A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercised

unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the owner
or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the
property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of possession of the
property." § 76-6-404.5(1).

11

One might surmise that this limitations problem was the driving force behind the
State's overcharging of the defendants. The Poseys presented their allegations to
the State in September 2008, well within a two-year period, but the State had not
filed the Information until March 2011, after the limitation period for
misdemeanors had passed. Id.
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The trial court did not instruct the jury on wrongful appropriation, or include it
as an option on the special verdict form. This was a critical omission. "Wrongful
appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as provided in Section 76-6~

412 ...." § 76-6-404.5(3). Not only does wrongful appropriation result in reduced
penalties, but conviction on the lesser included offense would have resulted in

~

automatic and non-appealable acquittals on the greater theft charges. See § 76-1403(1) and (2). Additionally, wrongful appropriation is not a predicate offense upon
which a violation of the Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act can be based. See § 76-10-

'4

1603 (list of UPUAA predicate offenses does not include § 76-6-404.5).
Accordingly, had the jury convicted only of wrongful appropriation, the defendants
would been acquitted on the UPUAA claim.
The only difference between theft and wrongful appropriation is the length of
time that the jury believes the defendant intended to appropriate the property.

Compare§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-404.5. In support of its theft counts, the State argued
to the jury that it need not find an intent to permanently deprive, that essentially it
could convict for any intended deprivation for any period of time. (R.153 8, p. 20:216 ("You are instructed that if one misappropriates and converts to his own use
money or property belonging to another under circumstances that constitute theft, it is
not made otherwise because the one doing so might have some intention of restoring
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the loss sometime .... If someone commits a theft and has someone else's property,
whether it's 30 months, 30 days, 30 seconds, returning it is not a defense.")
Under the State's own argument- that the jury could convict Didericksen even
if the intended deprivation was as little as 3 0 days or 3 0 seconds - the jury could
easily have found such deprivation "temporary," i.e., wrongful appropriation rather
than theft.

That is particularly true when the alleged actions extended over a

relatively short period of time, the defendants owned at least 75 percent of Tivoli,
and had reimbursed Tivoli for certain expenditures in the past (e.g., R.1535, p. 278~-

279:23-7; R.1536, p. 179-180:9-5).
The trial court was obligated to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense
of wrongful appropriation.

State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986)

(instruction must be given if there is any rational basis for acquitting the defendant of
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense); § 76-1-402(4).
Failure to do so was reversible error on all counts.
B.

This issue should be reviewed for ineffective assistance of counsel
and manifest injustice.

Notwithstanding the clear statutory language and the State's acknowledgement
that wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of theft, the
defendants' trial counsel "forwent an instruction on the lesser included offense of
misappropriation" (R.1383); see also R.1537, p. 214 (counsel stating that they were
"dropping" request for wrongful appropriation instruction). Counsel also did not
44
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object to a Verdict Form with theft as the jury's only option. (R.971 (verdict form).)
Trial counsel's reason for this decision was a belief that an agreement was in
place with the State that the trial court would interpret the Operating Agreement and
determine the Poseys' legal interest after the verdict. (R.1383.) Before the jury was
instructed, the court was advised that the defendants and State had an agreement:
MR. DIUMENTI: I think we've resolved it, your Honor. Go ahead,
Cli£ I think you can articulate the issue that we've agreed with [Mr. Taylor,
the State's counsel] about better than I can.
MR. THO:l.\1PSON: Well, yes. Counsel discussed that we are going to
ask the Court to look into the issue of what percentage of the ownership of the
assets under the contract, as a matter of law, is actually the Poseys' in
determining what the sentence should be. [Mr. Taylor] suggested that we brief
this in the intervening time.
THE COURT: Okay. Sure. I'll look at briefs if you want to do them.
MR. TAYLOR: So I'll just wait to see something from you? And then
I' 11 just file a responding brief.
(R.1538, p. 102:11-24.)
Accordingly, after the verdict, the defendants filed a memorandum addressing
the value of the Poseys' property as a matter of law, along with a motion for
~

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (R.984.) In response, however, the State
argued that the court should not interpret the Operating Agreement as a matter of law.
(R.1039.)
In their briefing, defense counsel stated that their discussion with the State's
counsel was "that the issue of what the true dollar amount of the Poseys' property
involved in the thefts was a matter of contract interpretation, and was a determination
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of law and a matter for the Court, not the Jury, and that the issue would be submitted
if the Defendants were convicted." (R.985; R.1125.)
The State denied that the statements made to the court reflected a stipulation
that the Operating Agreement would be interpreted by the trial court as a matter of
law; "[r]ather," according to the State, "the State suggested that the defendants could
reserve this issue for future briefing in the event of gui1ty verdicts." (R.1444.)
Defense counsel's interpretation of the agreement seems more consistent with
the actual statement in court. At the very least, an attorney could reasonably infer
agreement from the State's response to counsel's characterization. Regardless, what
is clear is that either: 1) Didericksen' s trial counsel reasonably believed there was a
stipulation with the State on which he relied in foregoing the instruction, and on
which the State later reneged, or 2) Didericksen's trial counsel unr~asonably believed
there was a stipulation with the State. Either way, a new trial is required, either to
remedy a manifest injustice or to remedy ineffective assistance of counsel.
This Court has provided guidance on when the failure to request a lesserincluded offense instruction constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

"The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,
246 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted).
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~

defendant must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness," and that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. .. whose result is reliable." Id
If Didericksen' s trial counsel waived a lesser included offense instruction due
to an unreasonable belief that a stipulation existed with the State, that unreasonable
4'

action - by definition - fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment. It would mean that counsel gave up an important right, one that could
have produced lower sentences and eliminated the most serious felony count
(UPUAA), for literally no reason, no conceivable benefit to the defendant.
Alternatively, if the exchange in court did reflect a stipulation, or could
reasonably have been interpreted as a stipulation by counsel, upon which the State
later reneged, then the Court's review of this issue is necessary to prevent manifest
injustice.

IV.
vJ

THE UPUAA COUNT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF
LAW, OR THE CONVICTION REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO
GIVE A COMPLETE ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION, AND BECAUSE
WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION IS NOT A PREDICATE OFFENSE.
A.

The trial court did not instruct the jury on all the required
elements of UPUAA.

Under the Sixth Amendment, "a defendant has the right to have a jury
determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the defendant is guilty of every
element of the crime charged." State v. Duran, 2011 UT App 254,
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468. In this case, the State charged Didericksen with one count of violating the
Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act,§ 76-10-1603. (See R.77-78.)
Among the statutory elements of UPUAA is the existence of a "pattern of
unlawful activity." Utah Code§ 76-10-1603. The State submitted a proposed jury
instruction on that element, to which Didericksen' s trial counsel did not object:
"Pattern of Unlawful Activity" means engaging in conduct which
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity,
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes
shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to each
other or to the enterprise. The most recent act constituting part of a pattern
of unlawful activity as defined shall have occurred within 5 years of the
commission of the next preceeding [sic] act alleged as part of the pattern.
(R.496,

,r

2.) While this instruction is a quote from part of the Act (§ 76-10-

1602(2)), it fails to require the jury to find a required element of a pattern under
UPUAA, i.e., that the required predicate acts occurred over a "substantial period of
time." See Hill v. Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28,

,r 39, 216 P.3d 929.

As such, the

instruction constitutes reversible error as a matter of law.
The reference to "continuing unlawful conduct" was added to the statutory
definition of "pattern" shortly after the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal RICO in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496
n.14, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Accordingly, the Utah Supreme
Court has said, "it makes sense to use the Supreme Court's clarification of that
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phrase as the test for whether there is a pattern of unlawful activity." Hill, 2009
UT 28, if 38.
That clarification, the court noted, came in H J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell

Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). In HJ.,
the U. S. Supreme Court rejected a contention that multiple schemes were required
to establish a pattern. The court held, however, that continuity must be shown.
With respect to closed continuity (when the alleged activities have ended prior to
charges being filed), "[c]ontinuity may be ~emonstrated 'over a closed period by
proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time[.]"

Id., 492 U.S. at 241-242, 109 S.Ct. at 2901.
Adopting a similar interpretation of UPUAA's pattern requirement, the Utah
Supreme Court held in Hill that "[t]he proper test for determining whether there
was a pattern of unlawful activity, is whether there was 'a series of related
predicates extending over a substantial period of time' or a demonstrated threat of
~

continuing unlawful activity and not whether there were multiple schemes." 2009
UT 28, ,r 41.
The State's instruction given by the trial court omitted the key requirement
that the related predicates extend over a "substantial period of time."

That

omission is material and highly prejudicial because, as noted above, the checks for
which the jury found theft extended over less than four months (December 21,
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2007, to April 11, 2008), with one small outlier in September 2008. See p. 19,

supra.
The Utah Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide what constitutes a
"substantial period of time" under Hill. However, the comt looked to federal law
in interpreting Utah's UPUAA, which was patterned after federal RICO and has
been amended by the statute legislature to incorporate federal RI CO rulings. See

Hill, 2009 UT 28,

,r,r 37-40.

Accordingly, it is appropriate to again seek federal

guidance on this issue.
Federal courts "overwhelmingly" hold that a period of less than one year is
insufficient - as a matter of law - to constitute a "substantial period of time" under
RICO. E.g., Jackson v. BellSouthTelecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1266 (11th Cir.
2004) ("The substantial period of time requirement for establishing closed-ended
continuity cannot be met with allegations of schemes lasting less than a year.")
(string citing cases); Menasco v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 684 (4th Cir.1989)
(finding no continuity when predicate acts with a single goal occurred over a oneyear period); Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir.1994) (17
month period insufficient to show continuity); J.D. Marshall Int'/, Inc. v. Reds tart,

Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 821 (7th CiR.1991) (13 months is not a substantial period of
time under RICO); Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402,
407 (8th Cir.1999) ( 10-month period is "too short" to constitute substantial period
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for purposes of closed-ended continuity); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971
F.2d 364, 366-67 (9th Cir.1992) ("We have found no case in which a court [of
appeals] has held the [continuity] requirement to be satisfied by a pattern of
activity lasting less than a year."); Efron v. Embassy Suites (P. R.), Inc., 223 F.3d
12, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) (no closed-ended continuity where predicate acts occurred
over 21-month period); Hughes v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594,
611 {3rd Cir.1991) (12 months "is not a substantial period of time" under RICO).
In the influential Second Circuit, the threshold is two years. First Capital
Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 181 (2nd Cir. 2004) ("[T]his
Court has never found a closed-ended pattern where the predicate acts spanned
fewer than two years."); see also GICC Capital Corp. v. Tech. Fin. Group, Inc., 61
F.3d 463, 467-68 (2d Cir.1995) (finding that courts of appeals have consistently
considered eleven months to be insufficiently "substantial").
In this case, 11 of the 12 checks were written during a single three-and-one-

vo

half month period, plainly not a "substantial period of time". Even if the small
September 2008 check were thrown in (which would be inconsistent with the
continuity concept itself), that would bring the maximum period to less than nine
months, again insufficient as a matter of law.
Under the State's own Amended Information and under the jury's verdict,
the UPUAA claim should have been dismissed. At a minimum, the jury should
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have been instructed on the required element of a "substantial period of time."
Either way, Didericksen's UPUAA conviction constitutes reversible error.

B.

Because wrongful appropriation is not a predicate act under
UPUAA, reversal under Point III requires reversal of the UPUAA
conviction.

UPUAA can be violated only by, among other things, comm1ss10n of
specified predicate acts. See § 76-10-1603. As noted, wrongful appropriation is
not one of those. Hence, if Didericksen' s convictions are reversed to address
wrongful appropriation, the UPUAA conviction must also be reversed.
I

c.

Review of this issue is warranted due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, plain error, and to prevent manifest injustice.

Didericksen's trial counsel did not seek dismissal of the UPUAA claim, or
request a jury instruction as to the substantial period of time requirement.
Knowledge of the law is a basic prerequisite to providing competent legal
assistance. An attorney who does not investigate clearly relevant law has failed to
provide effective assistance. See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Utah
1996) (holding failure to request consolidation of theft counts was ineffective
assistance because existing case law supported consolidation).
The Utah Supreme Court was not presented with this specific issue in Hill
(the acts there occurred over a five-year period), and has not been presented with
the issue since. However, the facial insufficiency of a four-month period - or even
nine, if the September 2008 check is included - is demonstrated by the
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"overwhelming weight of case authority." Jackson, supra, at 1267. The failure to
research this readily available and extensive case law, and to seek dismissal of the
UPUAA count thereunder, was ineffective assistance.
The error was compounded by not seeking a complete elements instruction.
The Utah Supreme Court clearly and unambiguously adopted the "substantial
i.il

period of time" requirement for a UPUAA pattern more than four years before
Didericksen' s trial. The failure to request an instruction on this express element
was ineffective assistance of counsel, and the court's failure to give an instruction
expressly required by Utah Supreme Court precedent constitutes plain error.
Allowing Didericksen's UPUAA conviction to stand in the face of case law
universally holding otherwise would also result in manifest injustice.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RESTITUTION AWARD.

A.

The court was required to take into account compensation
previously received by the victims.

As noted above, in November 2008, the Poseys entered into a Settlement
Agreement and Release with Equity Partners, Didericksen and Bruun. Pursuant to
the settlement and release, Equity Partners signed over the 29 acres in Saratoga
Springs to the Poseys, along with a payment from UDOT, and the Poseys paid
Equity Partners $25,000.00. The Poseys accepted this as compensation in full for
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each specific check that they were questioning. Seep. 20, supra, and Add. Exh.
F.12

The trial court erred in refusing to take into account this prior compensation
received by the victims when determining complete and court-ordered restitution.

See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417,

,r

12 n.3, 82 P.3d 211 (trial court was

obligated to factor in insurance payments received by the victim when determining
the amount of restitution); see also State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, ,r 7, 170 P .3d
1141 (rejecting State's argument that "limitations on civil damage awards, such as
those imposed by the no-fault insurance statutes, should not rigidly limit restitution
awards in criminal cases."); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 981-982 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (disagreeing with the State's argument that a court "may order
restitution without regard to potential civil affirmative defenses," but finding that a
release signed by victim was invalid because she had previously assigned her
claims to the Crime Victims' Reparations Trust Fund); State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d
611, 612-613 (Utah 1985) (noting that discharge in bankruptcy would be a defense
to some restitution claims).
The rehabilitative purposes of restitution do not mean that victims are
entitled to double recovery. A trial court must take into account any compensation
12

By statute, restitution is limited to damages caused by the offenses for which the
defendant was convicted, i.e., the 12 checks. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT App
273, ,r 5, 987 P.2d 1289.
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that the victim has already received toward his or her alleged damages, in this case
the retitled property and UDOT payment. The trial court's refusal to do so was
reversible error.
B.

Restitution cannot be awarded for any convictions that are
reversed.

To the extent that any of the convictions against Didericksen are reversed as
urged above, the portion of the restitution award associated with those counts must
also be reversed.

VI.

THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS REQUIRE REVERSAL.
As explained above, each error discussed above was material and

vJ

prejudicial. In addition, "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines []
confidence ... that a fair trial was had." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,

,r 25, 999 P.2d

7 (ellipse in original). LLC law and an operating agreement expressly addressing
Didericksen' s authority were not interpreted, nor was the jury correctly instructed.
Didericksen was incorrectly charged, and the jury incorrectly instructed (or not
instructed), regarding value and the effect of the Poseys' limited interest in the
LLC. The jury was also not instructed on a critical lesser included offense, nor on
a threshold element of UPUAA.

The errors described above eliminate any

perception that this trial was fair.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant Didericksen respectfully requests the
Court reverse the judgment, and remand with instructions to dismiss all counts
under Point I.

Alternatively, the case should be remanded with instructions to

dismiss all counts under Points II and III except counts 2, 7, 8, and 24, which
should be remanded for a new trial, and the UPUAA count should be dismissed as
discussed in Point IV. The restitution award should concomitantly be reversed,
and for the additional reasons stated in Point V.
~I

DATED this 13th day of May, 2015.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

/~11£(

CJJ1~

Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 111903467 FS

JAMES DIDERICKSON,
Defendant.

Judge:

KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN

Date:

January 17, 2014

PRESENT
Clerk:

jacquelc

Prosecutor: TAYLOR, JACOBS
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DIUMENTI JR, GEORGES
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 12, 1948
Audio
Tape Number:

v;

W43

CHARGES
2. THEFT

-

2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Not Guilty
3. THEFT

"'

-

4. THEFT

-

Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty

- Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty

3rd Degree Felony

Plea: Not Guilty

-

-

2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Not Guilty

5. THEFT

vJ

Tape Count: 9:27

- Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty

3rd Degree Felony

Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
7. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
8. THEFT

-

- Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty

2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Not Guilty

-

Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty

15. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
·~

Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
19. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
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Case No: 111903467 Date:

21.
22.
24.
28.

Jan 17, 2014

Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition:
THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition:
THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition:
THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition:
THEFT - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition:

11/15/2013 Guilty
11/15/2013 Guilty
11/15/2013 Guilty
11/15/2013 Guilty
11/15/2013 Guilty

29. PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY - 2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Not Guilty

- Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty

HEARING

The defendant is sentenced.
Defense counsels state the Restitution amount is in dispute and
disagreement.
Set Restitution Hearing on 02/21/14 at 2:00 pm.

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 111903467 Date:

I

Jan 17, 2014

Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
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Case No: 111903467 Date:

Jan 17, 2014

The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class A Misdemeanor, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed one year
in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Defendant is ordered to serve 1 year concurrent at the Salt Lake County
Jail, taken forthwith.

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 60 month(s).
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Case No: 111903467 Date:

Jan 17, 2014

Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation

&

Parole.

PROBATION CONDITIONS

Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and Parole.
If supervised by Adult Probation and Parole: all fines, fees and/or
restitution are to be paid directly to Adult Probation and Parole.
Pay monthly supervision fee as determined by probation agency.
Pay restitution in amount{s) as determined by prosecutor or probation
agency.
Complete 150 hours of community service.
Defendant is not to obtain any employment with fiduciary
responsibilities.
Defendant is not to have any contact with the Posey•s.
Set Restitution Hearing on 02/21/14 at 2:00 pm.
Defendant to serve 1 year in the Salt Lake County Jail, taken forthwith.
RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 02/21/2014
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W43
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN

Date:
KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN
District Court Judge

Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary
communicative aids and services) should call Third District Court-Salt
Lake at (801)238-7500 three days prior to the hearing. For TTY service
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Jan 17, 2014

call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128.

The general information phone number is

(801)238-7300.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
RESTITUTION HEARING
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 111903467 FS
Judge:
Date:
February 21, 2014

JAMES DIDERICKSON,
Defendant.

PRESENT
Clerk:
melodys
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, JACOBS
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DIUMENTI JR, GEORGES
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 12, 1948
Audio
Tape Number:
W43
Tape Count: 1.58

CHARGES
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
3. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
4. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
5. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
7. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
a. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
15. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
19. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/201~ Guilty
21. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
22. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
24. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
28. THEFT - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
29. PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/2013 Guilty
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Case No: 111903467 Date:

Feb 21, 2014

HEARING

Mr. Thompson addresses the Court.
2.06
Mr. Taylor addresses the Court.
2.24

~-.,·,.
~

Mr. Thompson responds.
2.28

Court orders restitution in the amount of $189,574.33. Restitution
is joint and several with Allan Bruun 111903468.
Restitution is complete and court ordered restitution.
monitor payments.

AP&P to

Review hearing is set.
RESTITUTION REVIEW is scheduled.
Date: 03/27/2015
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W43
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN

Before Judge:
Date:

Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary
communicative aids and services) should call Third District
Court-Salt Lake at (801)238-7500 three days ·prior to the hearing.
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general
information phone number is (801)238-7300.
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Utah Code § 48-2c-803. Management by members.
In a member-managed company, each member shall be subject to the duties
described in Section 48-2c-807 and, unless otherwise provided in this chapter, in
the articles of organization, or an operating agreement:
( 1) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding a
majority of profits interests in the company shall be required to decide
any matter connected with the business of the company;
(2) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of all members shall be
required to:
(a) amend the articles of organization, except to make ministerial
amendments including:
(i)
amendments made only to reflect actions previously
taken with the requisite approval, such as a change in
managers; or
(ii) to change an address;
(b) amend the operating agreement, except to make ministerial
amendments, including:
(i)
amendments made only to reflect actions previously
taken with the requisite approval, such as a change in
managers; or
(ii) to change an address; or
(c) (i)
authorize a member or any other person to do any act on
behalf of the company that contravenes the articles of
organization or operating agreement; and
(ii) after authorizing an act under Subsection (2)(c)(i) to
terminate the authority so granted; and
(3) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding 2/3 of
the profits interests in the company shall be required to bind the
company to any of the following actions:
(a) (i)
authorizing a member or any other person to do any act
on behalf of the company that is not in the ordinary
course of the company's business, or business of the kind
carried on by the company; and
(ii) after authorizing an act under Subsection (3)(a)(i) to
terminate the authority so granted;
(b) making a current distribution to members;
(c) resolving any dispute connected with the usual and regular
course of the company's business;
(d) making a substantial change in the business purpose of the
company;
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(e)
( f)
(g)

(h)

(i)

a conversion of the company to another entity;
a merger in which the company is a party to the merger;
any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or
substantially all of the company's property other than in the
usual and regular course of the company's business;
any mortgage, pledge, dedication to the repayment of
indebtedness, whether with or without recourse, or other
encumbering of all or substantially all of the company's
property other than in the usual and regular course of the
company's business; or
any waiver of a liability of a member under Section 48-2c-603.
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Utah Code §48-2c-804. Management by managers.
In a manager-managed company, each manager and each member shall be
subject to Section 48-2c-807 and:
( 1) (a)
the initial managers shall be designated in the articles of
organization;
and
(b)
after the initial managers, the managers shall be those persons
identified in documents filed with the division including:
(i)
amendments to the articles of organization;
(ii) the annual reports required under Section 48-2c-203; and
(iii) the statements required or permitted under Section 48-2c122 ·
'
(2) when there is a change in the management structure from a membermanaged company to a manager-managed company, the managers
shall be those persons identified in the certificate of amendment to the
articles of organization that makes the change;
(3) each manager who is a natural person must have attained the age of
majority under the laws of this state;
(4) no manager shall have authority to do any act in contravention of the
articles of organization or the operating agreement, except as provided
in Subsection (6)(g);
(5) a manager who is also a member shall have all of the rights of a
member;
(6) unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating
agreement of the company:
(a)
except for the initial managers, each manager shall be elected at
any time by the members holding at least a majority of the
profits interests in the company, and any vacancy occurring in
the position of manager shall be filled in the same manner;
(b) the number of managers:
(i)
shall be fixed by the members in the operating
agreement; or
(ii) shall be the number designated by members holding at
least a majority of the profits interests in the company if
the operating agreement fails to designate the number of
managers;
(c)
each manager shall serve until the earliest to occur of:
(i)
the manager's death, withdrawal, or removal;
(ii) an event described in Subsection 48-2c-708( 1)(f); or
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(iii)

(d)
(e)

(f)
(g)

if membership in the company is a condition to being a
manager, an event described in Subsection 48-2c708(1)(d) or (e);
a manager need not be a member of the company or a resident
of this state;
any manager may be removed with or without cause by the
members, at any time, by the decision of members owning a
majority of the profits interests in the company;
there shall be only one class of managers; and
approval by:
(i)
all of the members and all of the managers shall be
required for matters described in Subsection 48-2c803(2); and
(ii) members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the
company, and 2/3 of the managers shall be required for
all matters described in Subsection 48-2c-803(3).
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Utah Code § 76-1-302. Time limitations for prosecution of offenses . . .
Commencement of prosecution.

( 1)

Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: ... (b) a misdemeanor
other than negligent homicide shall be commenced within two years
after it is committed[.]
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Utah Code § 76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation - penalties.

( 1)

A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent
of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily
appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the
owner or legal custodian of possession of the property.

* * *
(4)

Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of
theft under Section 76-6-404.
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Utah Code§ 77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts.

( 1)
(2)

In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court,
questions of fact by the jury.
The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law
as well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the
court.
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Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(6). Definitions [Crime Victims Restitution Act].

"Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and
includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or
otherwise harmed, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and
suffering.

I~
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Utah Code § 77-38a-302(1) and (2)

(1)

When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose,
the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of
crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition.
For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution is
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as
provided in Subsections (2) through (5).

(2)

In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate
a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after
sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (5) ....
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Operating Agreement
for

Tivoli Properties, LLC
A Utah Limited Liability Company
THIS OPERATING AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of August 15, 2007 by and among
Equity Partners, LLC and Kerry R. and Bobbie M. Posey, ie; Tivoli Properties LLC, a Utah LLC (the
"Company'') and the persons executing this Operating Agreement as Members of the Company and all of
those who shall hereafter be admitted as Members (individually, a "Member" and collectively, the
"Members") whose names and signatures shall appear on "ME\.rBER LISTING; CAPITAL
CONTR.IBUTIO:'{S,'' belo\v, hereby agree as follows:

\VITNESSETH:
I. Whereas, the Members desire to enter into this agreement ('~Operating Agreement") or
r·Agreement ..) for the purposes of governing the Company, to and for the sole purpose of investing in,
· purchasing. selling, granting, or taking an option on lands for investment purposes and/or development. ..
The Company shall not conduct any other business unless related to the business, unless approved by
unanimous consent of all Members.
2. \.v11ereas, a limited liability company was fonned in accordance with the provisions of
the Utah Limited Liability Company Act (the "Act") under the name of Tivoli Properties, LLC (the
"Company") pursuant to a Certificate of Formation filed November 1 l, 2007, with the Utah Division of
Corporation. This Operating Agreement of the Company was entered into as of that same date.

3. Whereas, the Members intend to operate the Company, appoint a person or persons to assume
responsibility for certain management matters (che "Manager") and provide for the restriction on the
transfers of ownership interests in the Company ("Interests").

NO\V, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual premises below, and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is agreed as
follows:
I. DEFINITIONS
1.1 Scope. For purposes of this Agreement, unless the language or context clearly indicates that
a different meaning is intended, the following capitalized tenns shall have the meanings specified in this
Article.
1.2. Defined Terms.
t.::U. "Act" means the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act and any successor
statute, as amended from time to time.

1.2.2. "Agreement'~ means this Operating Agreement, including any amendments,
supplements, or modifications thereto.
Page I of 20
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1.2.3. u Articles,, means the articles of organization filed with the Utah Department of
Conunerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, to organize the Company as a limited
liability company, including any amendments.
1.2.4 "Available Funds" means the Company's gross cash receipts from operations. less
the sum of: (a) payments of principal. interest, charges, and fees pertaining to the Company's
indebtedness; (bO expenditures incurred incident to the usual conduct of the Company's business,
including with out limitation the ~fanager compensation payments made pursuant to Article 7.9; and~-)
amounts reserved to meet the reasonable needs of the Co~pany's business in the future as detennined by
the Manager in its sole discretion.
1.2.5 "Capital Accounf' of a i\lember means the capital account maintained for the
Member in accordance with Article II. paragraph 5.
1.2.6 "Code" means the internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

1.2. 7 ''Company'' means Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company.
l .2.8. "Loan,, means the acquisition and development loan obtained by Equity Partners,
LLC from a third party lending institution to finance the acquisition and development of the Propeny.
1.2.9 ''Loss" means. for any given tax year, the Company's loss for such tax year, as
detem1ined in accordance with accounting principles appropriate to the Company's method of accounting
and consistently applied.

l .2.10. "i\fanager" means a Person, Persons or Committee, whether or not consisting of
a Member, Members or not, who is vested with authority to manage the Company in accordance with
Article VII.

l .2.11. "i\lember" means an initial member of the Company and any Person who is
subsequently admitted as an additional or substitute member of the Company pursuant to the tem1s of this
Agreement.
1.2. l 2 "Membership Interest" or "Interest" means a Member's percentage interest in
the Company, consisting of the Member's right to share in Profits, receive distributions, participate in the
Company's governance, approve the Company's acts, participate in the designation and removal of a
Manager, and receive infonnation pertaining to the Company's affairs. The Membership lnterests of the
initial Members are set forth in Article 3.3. Changes in Membership Interests after the date of this
Agreement, including those necessitated by the admission and dissociation of Members, will be reflected
in the Company's records. The a11ocation of Membership Interests reflected in the Company's records
from time to time is presumed to be co1Tect for all purposes of this Agreement and the Act. Except as
expressly provided otherwise herein, with respect to the interest of a Transferee, "Interest" or
"Membership Interest'" means a Transferee's percentage interest in distributions from the Company;
provided that nothing in this sentence shall be interpreted to grant to a Transferee the right to vote on or
otherwise participate in any matter as a Member hereunder other than the right to receive distributions as
set forth in Article 6.1.5.
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1..2.13. "Net Investment'' means, with respect to each Member and as of any given date
of deremunation, the aggregate amount of cash capital contributions actually paid to and received by the
Company from such Member less all amounts of Available Funds distributed co such Member by the
Company \Vith respect co such Member's ~lembership Interest.
1.2.14. "Person" means any individual, association, cooperative, corporation, trust,
partnership. joinc venture, limited liability company, or other legal entity.
1.2.15. "Profif' means, with respect lo any given tax year: the Company's income for
such tax year, as determined in accordance with accounting principles appropriate to the Company's
method of accounting and consistently applied.
1.2.16. "Purchase Agreement" means that certain Real Estate Purchase Contract,
entered into by and among Equity Partners, LLC, as buyer, and Poseys as Seller, pursuant to which Seller
has agreed to sell and Equity Partners, LLC has agreed to purchase, the Property, as such contract is
amended from time lo time.
l.2.17 "Regulations" means proposed, temporary, or final regulations promulgated
under the Code by the Department of the Treasury, as amended.
l .2.18 "Seller" means, collectively, Kerry R. Posey, both individually and as a trustee of
the Kerry R. Posey Charitable Remainder Unitrust, and Bobbie M. Posey, both individually and as trustee
of the Bobbie M. Posey Charitable Remainder Unitrust, in each case in such individual's or trustee's
capacity as a seller under the Purchase Agreement.
l .2.19. "Property" means approximately 29 acres of real property located in Utah
County, Utah, held by Seller, Assessor Parcel Numbers 58-035-0029 and 58-035-0030, which real
property is the subject of the Purchase Agreement.
1.2.20 "Developer" means, Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company,
established to manage, improve, subdivide, develop, lease, and sell the Property and to perform all other
activities reasonably related thereto.
1.2.21 "Transfer" means, with respect to an Interest, a sale, pledge, encumbrance, lien,
assignment, subordinate, gift or any other disposition, direct or indirect, by i'v[ember, whether voluntary,
involuntary, or by operation of law; provided, however, that the tenn ..Transfer" shall not include a
redemption of all or part of a member's Membership Interest by the Company.
1.2.22. "Transferee" means a Person who acquires a Membership Interest by Transfer
from a Member or another Transferee and is not admitted as a Member in accordance with the Agreement..
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, a Transferee shall not have the rights of a Member set
forth in Article l .2.1 l, other than the right to receive distributions as set forth herein.
1.2.23. ''Sharing Ratio" shall mean the percentage representing the ratio that the
number of Units owned by a Member bears to the aggregate number of Units owned by all of the
Members. Upon the issuance of additional Units or the transfer, repurchase or cancellation of any
outstanding Units, the Sharing Ratios of the Members shall be recalculated as of the date of such issuance,
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transfer, repurchase or cancellation. The recalculated Sharing Ratio of each t\.·Iember shall be the
percentage representing the ratio that the number of Units owned by the Member bears to the aggregate
number of Units owned by all of the l\.lembers after giving effect to the issuance, transfer, repurchase or
cancellation.
1.2.24. "Unit" shall mean an equity interest in the Company. The Company shall have
tvio classes of Units: Class A and Class B. The two classes of Units shall be identical in all respects
except for their respective Voting Interests. The number or Units owned by each i\ lember shall be
determined in connection with the issuance of a membership interest in the Company in exchange for the
capital contribution made by such Member. Cnitially the Units shall not be represemed by certificates. [f
the tvianagement Committee determines that it is in the interest of the Company to issue certificates
representing the Units, certificates shall be issued and the Units shall be represented by such certificates.
The Company is authorized co issue 1,000,000,000 Class A Units and 200,000,000 Class B Units.
1

l .2.25 "Voting Interest" (a) With respect to the Class A Units, "Voting Interest" shall
mean that number of Class A Units held by a Member, and (b) with respect to the Class B Units, "Voting
Interest" shall mean that number of Class B Units held by a Member divided by l 0.

II. ORGANIZATION
2.1. Formation of the Companv. The Company has been organized as a Utah Limited Liability
Company pursuant to the Act. The rights and obligations of the Members shall be as set forth in the Act
unless the Articles or this Agreement expressly provide othenvise, in which case the provisions of the
Articles or this Agreement shall control.
2.2. Name of the Companv. The name of the Company shall be: TIVOLI PROPERTIES,
L.L.C. and all Company business shall be conducted in that name or such other name the Members may
select from time to time and which is in compliance with applicable laws.
2.3. Registered Agent and Location of Records. The registered agent and registered office of
the Company in the State of Utah shall be the initial registered agent and registered office set f011h in the
Articles or such other Person or location, as the case may be, as the Manager may designate from time to
time. The records of the Company required to be maintained by the Act shall be kept at the designated
office identified in the Articles, or at such other designated office as the Manager may designate from
time to time, consistent with the Act.
2.4. Purposes of the Companv. The Company is organized for the purpose of carrying on the
business of acquiring, managing, improving. subdividing, developing, leasing and selling the Property or
any other enterprise that members may mutually agree upon.
2.5. Fiscal vear, accounting. The Company's fiscal year shall be the calendar year. the pa1ticular
accounting methods and principals to be followed by the Company shall be selected by the accountant for
the Company ('' Accountant'') who is hereby designated as Dallas Cooke. CPA as the independent CPA
fim1, The CPA Accountant may be changed by written Notice of the then serving Manager, consented to
in writing by at least Two {2) Members.
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2.6. Reports. The Managers shall provide reports concerning the financial condition and results
of operation of the Company and the Capital Accounts of the Members to the Members in rhe time,
manner, and fom1 as the Manager determines. Such reports shall be provided at least annually as soon as
practible after the end of each calendar year and shall include a statement of each Member's share of
profits and other items of income, gain, loss, deduction and credit.

2. 7. Term of Existence. The company shall begin on 15th day of August, 2007, and shall
continue until dissolved by mutual consent or by a 30 day notice in writing on the part of the person or
persons desiring to withdraw to the other member or members of the company, and the member or
members desiring to withdraw shall first offer all his right, title and interest in the company and assets
thereof to the other member or members at a valuation to be determined by three disinterested persons,
one of whom shall be named by the member or members desiring to withdraw, one by the remaining
member or members and the third by the two so chosen.

III. CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
3.1 Initial Capital Contributions. The Members shall make the following initial capital
contributions to the Company, in cash, services, or property, in the following amounts:
3.1.1. Contributions from Equity Partners. Equity Partners shall contribute and
assign to the Company all of Equity Partners' right, title, and interest as buyer in, to, and under the
Purchase Agreement and the Company shall assume and shall perfom1 all of Equity Partners obligations
as buyer thereunder. Furthem10re, Equity Partners \Vill arrange for, sign and guarantee an interim loan in
the amount of Seven Hundred-Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000.00) which will be used as operating
capital for the Company. Additionally, all amounts paid by Equity Partners pursuant to the entitlement
process, Purchase Agreement or otherwise related to the acquisition and development of the Property,
whether paid prior to or after the execution of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be capital contributions
made to the Company by Equity Partners. As of the date of this Agreement, the aggregate amount of such
deemed capital contribution made by Equity Partners to the Company $800,000.00. Once the Loan is
obtained, Equity Partners shall set aside and pay $10,000.00 per month to the Sellers from the operating
capital of the Company. As a result of such contribution, Equity Partners has been credited with a capita)
account equal to SS00,000.00, and has received 800,000 Class A Units.

3.1.2 Contribution from Kerrv R. Pusev. Kerry R. Pu~e:y shall contribute the carrying
costs of his subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One Hundred
Seventy-five Thousand Dollars (5175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the Company
by Kerry R. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Kerry R. Posey has been credited with a capital
account equal to S125,000.00, and has received l 00,000 Class A Units and 25,000 Class 8 Units.

l.fP

3.1.3 Contribution from Bobbie M. Posey. Bobbie M.. Posey shall contribute the
carrying costs of her subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One
Hundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars (S 175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the
Company by Bobbie M. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Bobbie tvf. Posey has been credited with
a capital account equal to S 125,000.00, and has received I 00,000 Class A Units and 25,000 Class B Units
3.2 Initial Commitments and Contributions. By the execution of this Operating Agreement,
the initial Members hereby agree to make the capital contributions set forth herein. The interests of the
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respective Members in the total capital of the Company {their respective "Sharing Ratios", as adjusted
from time to time to reflect changes in the Capital Accounts of the Members and the total capital in the
Company). Any additional Member (other than an assignee of a Membership [nterest who has been
admitted as a Member) on any capital contribution except as provided in this Operating Agreement.
3.3 Allocation of Membership Interest, As a result of the transactions described above, the
Members own the number and classes of Units and have capital account balances attributable to the Units
as set forth below:

Member

Class ''A,, Units

Class "B'' Units

Equity Partners

750,000

-0-

$750,000

Kerry R. Posey

100,000

25,000

S125,000

Bobbie M. Posey

100,000

25,000

$125,000

Capital Account Balance

Based on the above, the initial Sharing Ratio of Equity Partners is 75%, and the initial Sharing Ratio of
Kerry R. and Bobbie M. Posey is 12.5% each.
3.4 Subsequent Capital Contributions No Member shall be obligated to make any capital
contributions to the Company other than those set forth herein, except as the Company and such Member
may agree in writing.
3.5 Failure to Contribute. [f any member fails to make a capital contribuLion when required, the
Company may, in addition to the other rights and remedies the Company may have under the Act or
applicable law, take such enforcement action (including, the commencement and prosecution of court
proceedings) against such Member as the Managers consider appropriate. Moreover, the remaining
Members may elect to contribute the amount of such required capital themselves according to their
respective Sharing Ratios. fn such an event, the remaining Members shall be entitled to treat such amounts
as an extension of credit to such defaulting Memher, pt1yt1hle upon demand, with interest accruing thereon
at the federal midtenn rate provided for under Code Sec. l 274(d), plus Two Percent (2%) until paid, all of
which shall be secured by such defaulting Member's interest in the Company, each Member who may
hereafter default, hereby granting to each Member who may hereafter grant such an extension of credit, a
security interest in such defaulting Member's interest in the Company.
3.6 Return of Capital Contributions. Except as expressly provided herein, each Member
agrees not to withdraw as a Member of the Company and no Member shall be entitled to the return of an
part of his or her capital contributions or to be paid interest in respect to either his or her Capital Account
or his or her capital contributions.

3. 7 Capital Accounts of the Members. Separate Capital Accounts for each tvlember shall be
maintained by the Company. Each Member's Capital Account shall reflect the Member's capital
contributions and increases for the Member's share of any net income or gain of the Company. Each
Member's Capital Account shall also reflect decreases for distributions made to the Member and the
Member's share of any losses and deductions of the Company.
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3. 7. 1. Each Member's Capital Account may be increased by:
(i) The amount of money contributed by the Member to the Company.
(ii) The fair market value of propeny contributed by the Member to the Company(net of
liabilities secured by such contributed property that the Company is considered to assume
or take subject to under Code Sec ... [f any property, other than cash, is contributed to or
distributed by the Company, the adjustments to Capital accounts required by Treasury
Regulation Sec ... shall be made.
(iii) The Member's share of the increase in the tax basis of Company property, if any,
arising out of the recapture of any tax credit.

V. MEMBERS
5.1 Initial Memben. The initial Members of the Company are the Persons executing this
Agreement as Members as of the date first set forth above, each of which is admitted to the Company as a
Member effective contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement by such person.
5.2 Member Compensation. The members shall be paid such salaries as may be agreed upon
which will be charged as an expense of the business.

5 .2.1 The salaries so paid, as provided hereof, shall not be considered as part of the
profits to which said parties shall be entitled.

5.3 Rights and duties of the Members.
5.3. l Allocation. Each of the members shall be entitled to the net profits of the
business, as well as the losses happening in the course of the business which shall be
borne by each member. Such shall be borne in the same proportions as their respective
company ownership, unless the same shall happen through the wilful neglect or default
and not the mistake or error) of either of the members. In which case the loss so incurred
shall be made good by the member through whose neglect or default such losses shall
arise.

5.3.2. Distributions. The Managers may make distributions to the Members from time
to time. Distributions may be made only after the Managers detennine in their reasonable
judgement, that the Company has sufficient cash on hand which exceeds the current and
the anticipated needs of the Company to fulfill its business purposes (including needs for
operating expenses, debt service, acquisitions, reserves, and mandatory distributions, if
any). All distributions shall be made to the Members in accordance with their Sharing
Ratios. Distributions shall be in cash or property or particularly in both, as detennined by
the Managers. No distribution shall be declared or made if, after giving it effect, the
Company would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of
business or the Company's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities
plus, the amount that would be needed if the Company were to be dissolved at the time of
the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights of other Members upon dissolution that
are superior to the rights of the Members receiving the distribution.
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5.3.3. Familv Partnership Savings Provision. Notwithstanding anything in this
Operating Agreement to the contrary, should any provision of this Operating Agreemenc,
or any act of the parties, result in violation of the family partnership provisions of Code
Sec. 704(e) or the regulations and cases thereunder, the Managers may amend this
Agreement, or take any other actions reasonably necessary to prevent such violation. or to
correct such violation.

5.3.4. Other business ln view of the fact that all the Members are engaged in other
business ventures, no member shall be bound to devote all of his time to the affairs of the
company but he shall devote at least a part of his working time to the affairs of the
company business and when the demands of the business shall warrant, he agrees to give
his entire working time to the business.
5.3.5 Conduct of the Con10am· Any questions regarding the conduct of the Company
business shall be determined by a vote of 100% of the Managing Members of the
Company.
5.3.6 Business Continuation. The expulsion of any Member shall not dissolve the
Company as to other Members, and the remaining Members shall have right to continue
the Company business by themselves or in conjunction \vith any other person or persons
they might select.

5.3. 7 \Vithdrawal The Members shall have the right lo retire or withdraw from the
Company, and this Agreement may be terminated as to one or more Members and new
members may be admitted under the provisions hereinafter set forth, but neither such
retirement, withdrawal, tennination, death of any Member, or admission of any new
1\-lember shall dissolve this Company.
5.3.8 Selling of Members Interest Should one or more of the members desire to sell
his or their interest in the company or to withdraw from th,:- compnny hr. or they ~halJ do
so upon the following tenns:
(i) He or they shall give to the remaining member or members 30 days' written

noc ice of such intention and shall, if the other member or members indicates
willingness to buy within such 30 days, sell to the remaining member or members
his or their interest in the company for an amount equal to the value of the interest
or interests according to standard accounting procedure. [n the valuation of the
interest, market value, not book value: is to be considered; nor is goodwill to be
considered as an asset.
(ii) The selling member or members shall accept payment for his or their interest
in cash to be paid within 45 days from the giving of a notice of acceptance by the
remaining member or members.
(iii) The option to purchase may be exercised by the remaining members, if more

than one, in equal proportion, or, if one of them fails to exercise his option and
the others do not fail to do so, the latter shall have the right to purchase the whole
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of the selling member's or members' interest. The selling member or members
shall not be required to sell unless their entire interest in purchased.
(iv) Should there be any disagreement by the members as to the value of the

interest of the selling member or members, the selling member or members shall
appoint an arbitrator and the buying member or members shall appoint another
and if these two arbitrators are unable to agree, the two shall appoint a third
arbitrator, and the value of selhng member's or members' interest fixed by said
arbitrators or any two of them shall detenuine the purchase price. All parties
agree to be bound by such decision of the arbitrators.
5.4. i\lanner of Acting Among Members

5.4.1. No Member shall, without consent in writing of the other Members, do any of the
following:
(i). Assign his share or interest in the Company.

(ii) Except by will, no Member shall sell, pledge or in any way encumber his or her

interest in the Company without written consent of all other Members.
(iii) Without the consent of all the other Members or Member, draw, accept, or sign any

bill of exchange or promissory note, or contract any debt on account of the Company, or
employ any of the money or effects thereof, or in any manner pledge the credit thereof,
except in the usual an regular course of business. Any infraction of this pro~·ision shall be
a ground for an immediate dissolution of the Company as regards that Member so
offending, and the other Members may forthwith declare the same dissolved by a written
notice to the offending Member, or left for him at the office of the Company.
(iv) Without the consent of all the other Members or Member, compound, release, or
discharge any debt which shall be due or owing to the Company, without receiving the
full amount thereof. Any infraction of this provision shall be a ground for an immediate
dissolution of the Company as regards that Member so offending, and the other Members
may forthwith declare the same dissolved by a wrillc::11 riolice to the offending Member, ur
left for him at the office of the Company.
(v) Lend any money, or give credit to, or have dealings on behalf of the Company, with
any person, company, or corporation whom the other Members or Member shall have
forbidden him to trust or deal with; and if he shall act contrary to this provision he shall
repay to the Company any loss which may have been incurred thereby.

(vi) Hire or dismiss, except in case of gross misconduct, any clerk or other person in the
employment of the Company, without the consent of all the other Members.
(vii) Give their signature separately or collectively on behalf of the company or any
i\·lember thereof, except for legitimate business purposes and \.Vith the consent of l 00% of
the other Members of the Company.
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(viii) Without the previous consent in writing of all the other i'vkmbers, enter into any
bond. or become bail, surety, or security, for any person.
(ix) Buy, ordert or contract for any article exceeding the value of S500.00 dollars, without
the previous consent in writing of all the other Members; and in case he or she does so~
the other Members shall have the option to take the goods or articles so bought, ordered,
or contracted for, on behalf of the Company, or to leave the same for the separate use of
the i\.kmber so buying, ordering, or contracting, to be paid for out of his or her own
money.
(x) Have the right to embark in any speculative transactions involving the Company
without the consent of all the other Members.

(xi) Di\,ulge to any person not a ivlember of the Company any trade secret connected with
the Company business that shall come to his or her knowledge by reason of his or her
being a Member, during the continuance of this Company and for five (5) years after its
tennination.

(xii) With the approval of all the other Members and consent of the all ivlembers, any
Member shall be entitled to purchase any goods carried by the Company at actual invoice
price, plus the freight.
5.4.2 Meetings. An ammal meeting of ~·[embers for the transaction of such business as
may properly come before the Meeting, shall be held at such place, on such date and at
such time as the Managers shall detennine. Special meetings of Members for any proper
purpose or purposes may be called at any time by the Managers or the holders of at least
Ten Percent(l0%) of the Sharing Ratios of all Members. The Company shall deliver or
mail written Notice stating the date, time , place, and purposes of any meeting to each
Member entitled to vote at the meeting. Such Notice shall be given not less than Ten( 10)
and no more than Sixty(60) days before the date of the meeting. All meetings of Members
shall be presided over by a Chairperson who shall be a Manager. A Member may
participate and vote at such meeting via phone conference call.
5.4.3. Consent. Any action required or permitted to be taken at an annual or special
meeting of the Members may be taken without a meeting, without prior Notice, and
without a vote, if consents in writing, setting forth the action so taken, are signed by the
Members having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to
authorize or take action were present and voted. Every written consent shall bear the dale
and signature of each Member who signs the consent. Prompt Notice of the taking of
action \vithout a meeting by less than unanimous written consent shall be given to all
Members who have not consented in writing to such action.
5.4.4 \'oting Rights. Each member shall have a number of votes equal to such
Member's Membership Interest in the Company.

5.4.4.1 Required Vote. Except with respect to matters for which a greater
minimum vote is required by the Act or this Agreement, the vote of Members
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whose aggregate ~-Iembership [merest exceeds 50°:o of the aggregate t\-Iembership Interest
of all Members present binds the Company.

VI. TER~Il~ATION OR DISSOLCTlON
6.1 Accounting. Upon the dissolution of the Company a full and general account of the
assets. liabilities. and transactions of the Company shall be taken, and the assets and propert.y
thereof shall, as soon as practicable, be sold, the debts due the Company collected, the proceeds
applied, first, in discharge of the liabilities of the company and the expenses of liquidating the
same; and next in payment to each Member or his or her representatives of any unpaid interest or
profits belonging to him or her, and of his or her share of the capital; and the surplus, if any, shall
be divided between the Members or their representatives in equal shares; and the Members or
their representatives shall execute all such instruments for facilitating the collection and division
of the Company, and for their mutual indemnity and release, as may be requisite or proper.
6.2 Distribution. The Members agree that the detemunation of the amount to be paid
to either Member shall be detennined by the auditor or certified public accountant then
employed by the company, and such computation shall be final and conclusive upon them.
6.3. Goodwill On the te1mination or dissolution of the Company or the death or
retirement therefrom of a Member, neither the goodwill of the Company nor the right to the use of
the finn name shall be considered as an asset of the Company, nor shall any value be placed
thereon for the purpose of accounting or distribution.
6.4 Death of Member Upon the death of any Member, the Company shall immediately
cease as to him or her, but shall continue as to the survivors in accordance with the tenns and
conditions hereinafter set forth.
(i). Upon the death of any Member, the surviving Members shall have the right to

purchase the interest of the deceased Member at the appraised value reached by appraisers
selected as herein stated.
(ii) If the surviving Members do not desire to purchase the interest of the deceased
Member, they shall have the right to continue to operate the Company business so long as
it shows a profit; and accurate records shall be kept and frequent audits made to ascertain
whether a profit is being made for a term of one year. In this event the profits of the
deceased Member shall be paid to his or her legal representative or representatives in
semiannual installments.

(iii) After the term of one year without the surviving Members purchase of the interest of
the deceased Member, an account and statement shall be taken and made out of his or her
share of the capital and effects of the Company, and of aH unpaid interest and profits
belonging to him or her up to the time of his decease plus the year extension, for which
purpose a valuation shall be made of any assets or effects requiring valuation, and the
amount so ascertained to be due and O\Ving to the deceased Member shall be paid by the
surviving Members to his or her representatives within three (3) calendar months from the
date of the one year extension from his or her decease, with interest thereon until payment
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ac rhe rate of l O percent per annum ( l 0%); and on such payment the share of the deceased
Member in the Company property and effects shall go and belong to the surviving
Members in the proportions in which they shall have contributed to the purchase thereof.
(iv) ln case of the death of a Member and of the purchase of his or her interest by the
remaining Members as herein provided, the right to use the name of the Company and to
carry on the business under such name shall. so far as the deceased Member is concerned,
be the propeny of the remaining lvlembers.
(v) [n the event the remaining Members do not perfonn under the terms set forth above in
respect to the purchase of the deceased portion of the Company, the Company's business
shall be wound up and liquidated in 30 days from the fore-named time limit and divided
as herein provided.
6.5 Bankruptcv or insolvencv of a l\Jember. If any member shall be adjudicated bankrupt, or
insolvent, or take proceedings for liquidation by arrangement or composition with it, his or her creditors,
the Company shall thereupon tem1inate as to it, him, or her and it, he, she, or its, his or her executors,
administrators or assigns, as the case may be, shall have no interest in common with the surviving or other
Members or Member in the property of the Company, but shall be considered in equity as a vendor to the
surviving Members or Member for the share in the company of the bankrupt or liquidacing or
compounding Member as and from the date of its, his or her bankruptcy, or insolvency, or of its, his or her
having compounded as aforesaid, for the price and on the tenns to be a1Tived at under the provisions
hereinbefore contained.
6.5. l This Agreement is expressly not intended for the benefit of any creditor of the
Company, the Manager, the Members, or any other Person. Except and only to the extent
provided by applicable statute, no such creditor or third party shall have any rights under
this Agreement. No third person shall under any circumstances have any right to compel
any actions or payments by the Company, any Manager, or any Member.

VII. BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
7.1 Business of the Companv. (a) Equity Partners, LLC ("EP") shall have full, exclusive and
complete authority and discretion in the management and control of the business of the Company for the
purposes herein stated and shall make all decisions affecting the business of the Company. At such, any
action taken shall constitute the act of, and serve to bind, the Company. EP shall manage and control the
affairs of the Company to the best of its ability and shall use its best efforts to carry out the business of the
Company and will be compensated for providing various services.

(b) The expenses so paid, as provided hereof, shall not be considered as part of the
profits to which any of the parties shall be entitled.
(c) All the members of the company shall fix the wages or salaries to be paid to any of
the members of the company, and shall be binding upon all.
(d) The Company has retained Four Winds Development Group. LLC ("Four Winds'') as
their representative to obtain all necessary governmental permits, approvals and
entitlements which are required to allow the improvement, development, construction and·
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sale of the real estate property. Suc.h expenses are considered expenses of the Company
and shall be paid by Four Winds and shall be reimbursed by the Company.
(e) The Company shall indemnify, save ham1less, and pay all expenses, costs, or
liabilities of any Member who for the bendit of the Company makes any deposit, acquires
any option, or makes any other similar payment or assumes any obligation in connection
with any property proposed to be acquired by the Company, which action shall have been
consented to by the Company, and who suffers any financial loss as the result of such
action.
7.2 Change of l\.fanngers The Members from time to time may change the number of Managers
upon the affirmative vote or \vritten consent of Members holding an aggregate ofnot less than 100% of
the outstanding Membership Interest.
7.3 Election of l\.Ianagers Managers shall be elected at a meeting of the Members in the case
of a Manager vacancy. [f more than one l\.fanager is to be elected, all management positions shall be filled
in the same election, i.e.; the candidate with the highest vote total will fill the first available position, the
candidate with the next highest vote total will fill the next available position, and so forth. In voting for
lvlanagers, each l'vlember shall have the number of votes equal to his, her or its Membership Interest.
Members may cast all of their votes for one candidate, or divide their votes among multiple candidates.
7.4. General Powers of Managers. Except as may otherwise be provided in this Operating
Agreement, the ordinary and usual decisions concerning the business and affairs of the Company, shall be
made by the Managers. The managers have the power, on behalf of the Company, to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out the business and affairs of the Company, including, the power to:
7.4. l Purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire any real or personal property;
Sell, convey, mortgage, grant a security interest in, pledge, lease, exchange, or othef\vise
dispose or encumber any real or personal property;
7.4.2 Open one or more depository accounts and make deposits into, and write checks
and withdrawals against such accounts;
7.4.3 Borrow money, incur liabilities, and other obligations;

7.4.4 Enter into any and all agreements and execute any and all contracts, documents, and
instruments relating to the Business;
7.4.5 Engage consultants and agents, define their respective duties and establish their
compensation or remuneration;

7.4.6 Obtain insurance covering the Business and affairs of the Company's name;
7.4.7 Participate with others in partnerships, joint ventures, and other associations and
strategic alliances only where same are directly in pursuit of the Business, as de.fined
above.
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7.4. 7.1 There is an express limitation on the nature of the Business and the
po\.vers granted the ivfanagers herein, the Company is intended to purchase and
develop, hold and sale real estate for investment purposes only. and no activities
inconsistent with such limited purposes shall be undertaken.
7.5. Limitations. Notwithstanding the foregoing and any other provision contained in this
Operating Agreement to the contrary, no act shall be taken, sum expended, decision made, obligation
incurred or po·wer exercised by any Manager on behalf of the Company except by the consent of One
Hundred percent ( l OO~·'o) of all Membership Interests with respect to:
7.5.1 Any significant and material purchase, receipt, lease, exchange, or other acquisition
of any real or personal property or business;
7.5.2 The sale of all or substantially all of the assets and property of the Company;

7.5.3 Any mortgage, grant of security interest, pledge. or encumbrance upon all or
substantially all of the assets and property of the Company;
7.5 .4 Any merger;
7.5.5 Any amendment or restatement of the Articles or of this Operating Agreement;
7.5.6 Any matter which could result in a change in the amount or character of the
Company's capital;
7.5.7 Any change in the character of the business and affairs of the Company:
7.5.8 The commission of any act which would make it impossible for the Company to
carry on its ordinary business and affairs;
7.5.9 Any act that would contravene any provision of the Articles or of this Operating
agreement or the Act.
7.6. Standard of Care. Every Manager shall discharge his or her duties as a Manager in good
faith, with care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances,
and in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the Company. A manager shall
not be liable for any monetary damages to the Company for any breach of such duties except for a receipt
of a financial benefit to which the Manager is not entitled; voting for or assenting to a distribution to
Members in violation of this Operating Agreement.
7.7 Tenure of Managers. Each Manager shall serve for an indefinite period, except that: (a) a
Manager may resign at any time by giving written notice to the Members at least 30 days prior to the
effective date of the resignation; (b) a Manager who is a natural personal shall cease to be a Manager upon
his or her death or at such time as he or she is adjudicated incompetent; (c) a Manager who is a legal
entity other than a natural person shall cease to be a Manager upon its dissolution or upon a change in the
controlling ownership of such Person; {d) a Manager shall cease to be a tVfanager at such time as he or she
files • or fails to successfully contest, a petition seeking liquidation, reorganization, arrangement,
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readjustment, protection, relief, or composition in any state or federal bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization, or receivership proceeding: and (e) if a court of competent jurisdiction removes a ~fanager
for cause, such Manager shall cease to be a Manager upon the date of such order.
7.8. i.Hanagers Need Not be Members.

v;

A Manager need not also be a Member.

7.9. Informal Action. Any action required or permitted to be taken by the Manager may be taken
without a meeting if the action is evidenced by a written record describing the action taken, signed by the
Manager.

VIII. EXCuLPATION OF LIABILITY: INDEi\l~IFICATION
8.1. Exculpation of Liabilitv. Unless otherwise provide by law or expressly assumed. a
person who is a ?\·[ember or Manager, or both, shall not be liable for the acts debts or liabilities of the
Company.
1

8.2. Indemnification. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the Company shall indemnify
any Manager and may indemnify any employee or agent of the Company who was or is a party or is
threatened to be made a party to a threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether
civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative, and whether fonnal or infom1al, other than an action by or
in the right of the Company, by reason of the fact that such person is or was a l\'fanager, employee or agent
of the Company against expenses, including attorney's fees, judgements, penalties, fines, and amounts
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit or
proceeding, if the person acted in good faith, with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances, and in a manner that such person reasonably believed to be in
the best interests of the Company and with respect to a criminal action or proceeding, if such person had
no reasonable cause to believe such person s conduct was unlawful.
1

8.2.1. To the extent that a Member, employee, or agent of the Company has been
successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of an action, suit, or proceeding or in the
defense of any claim, issue, or other matter in the action, suit, or proceeding. such person
shall be indemnified against actual and reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit, or proceeding and any action:
suil or proceeding brought to enforce the mandatory indenmification provided herein. Any
indenmi fication pennitted under this Article, unless ordered by a court, shall be made by
the Company only as authorized in the specific case upon a detem1ination that the
indemnification is proper under the circumstances because the person to be indemnified
has met the applicable standard of conduct and upon an evaluation shall be made by a
majority vote of the Members who are not parties or threatened to be made parties to the
action. suit, or proceeding. Notwithstanding the forgoing to the contrary, no
indemnification shall be provided to any Manager, employee. agent of the Company for or
in connection with the receipt of a financial benefit to which such person is not entitled,

voting for or assenting to a distribution to Members in violation of this Operating
Agreement or the Act, or a knowing violation of law.

8.3 Insurance. The Company shall maintain for the protection of the Company and all of its
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Members such insurance as rhe !v(anagemem Committee, inits sole discretion, deems necessary for the.
operations being conducted.

IX. AGREEi\lE~TS WITH THIRD P.-\RTIES A:'cD WITH AFFILIATES OF THE

C01IPA~Y
9.1. Validitv of Transactions. Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement maybe engaged co
perfom1 services for the Company. The validity of any transaction, agreement or payment involving the
Company and any Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement otherwise pennitted by the tenns of this
Agreement shall not be affected by reason of the relationship between them and such Affiliates or the
approval of said transactions: agreement or payment.
9.2. Other Activities Any Member and the i\,·lanagers mny engage in other business ventures of
every nature, including! without limitation by specification, the ownership of another business similar to
that operated by the Company. Neither the Company nor any of the other Members shall have any right or
interest in any such independent venture or to the income and profits derived therefrom.
X. BOOKS, RECORDS, REPORTS, AND BANK ACCOUNTS.
10.1 There shall be kept at all times, during the continuance of the company, full and correct
books of account wherein each of the members shall enter all moneys by them or either of them received,
paid, laid out, or expended in and about the business, as well as all goods, wares, commodities, and
merchandise by them or either of them bought or sold, by reason or on account of the business and the
management thereof in ;:iny wise he longing. The books shall be used in common among the members, so
that any of them may have access thereto without an interruption or hindrance of the others.

10.1. l The company shall operate on the basis of a calendar year. On the last day of each
year, a general account shall be taken of the assets and liabilities of the company and of
all dealings and transactions of the same during the then preceding calendar year or
portion thereof.

IO. l .2 The bankers of the firm shall be Zion's 1st National Bank or such other bankers as
shall from time to time be agreed upon by the members, and all money and credits not
required for current expenses shall be deposited with the bank, and all checks, drafts, bills
of exchange, promissory notes or the like drawn thereon shall be signed one member and
countersigned by another, and shall be of no effect unless so signed and countersigned.
All indorsement of commercial paper by _the company shall be by the company stamp or
name affixed by any member, and the same shall be signed by two members; and shall be
of no effect unless so made. If any member shall give such obligation, except in the case
aforesaid, the same shall be deemed to be given on his separate account and shall be
payable out of his separate estate, and he shall indemnify the other member or members
against the payment thereof.
10. 2 Schedule K-1. On or before the 901h day following the end of each fiscal year of the
Company's existence, the Company shall cause each Member to be furnished with a federal (and where
applicable state) income tax reporting Schedule K-1 or its equivalent.
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10.3 "Tnx iVlatters Partner.,, The Members shall designate a Member to rhe "Tax Matters
Panner'' of the Company pursuant to Section 6231 (a)(7) of the Code. The Member so designated is
authorized to take such actions as are pennitted by Sections 6221 through 6233 of the Code. The initial
Tax Maners Partner shall be James Didericksen, in his capacity as a Member of Equity Partners. The Tax
MaLters Partner may be removed by the rvfembers at any time with or without cause. The Tax Matters
Partner will infonn the Members of all administrative and judicial proceedings pertaining to the
determination of the Companfs tax items and will provide the Members with copies of all notices
received from the Internal Revenue Service regarding the commencement of a Company-level audit or a
proposed adjustment of any of the Company is tax items. The Company will reimburse the Tax l'vfatters
Pa11ner for reasonable expenses properly incurred while acting within the scope of the Tax Matters
Parcner·s authority, including, but not limited to, legal and accounting fees, claims, liabilities, losses, and
d~mages. The payment of such expenses shall be made as an expense of the Company and before any
di.mibutions are made to Members. The provisions related to limitation of liability and indemnification of
the 1\-fanagers set forth in this Agreement shall be fully applicable to the Member acting as the Tax
Matters Partner for the Company.

XI. DISSOLUTION A~D \'1NDING UP
11.1. Dissolution. The Company shall dissolve and its affairs shall be wound up on the firs1 to
occur of the following events:

(i) At any time specified in the Articles or this Operating Agreement;
(ii) Upon the happening of any event specified in the Articles or this Operating
Agreement;
{iii) By the unanimous consent of all Members;
(iv) Upon the death, withdraw I, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a Member or the

occurrence of any other event that rem1inates the continued memberships of a Member in
the Company unless within Ninety (90) days after the disassociation of membership~ a
majority in interest of the remaining Members consent to continue the business of the
Company and to the admission of one or more Members as necessary.
11.2. Winding Up. Upon dissolution, the Company shall cease carrying on its business and
affairs and shall conunence the winding up of the Company's business and affairs and complete the
winding up as soon as practical. Upon the winding up of the Company, the assets of the Company shall be
distributed first to creditors to the extent pennitted by law, in satisfaction of Company debts, liabilities,
obligations ant then to Members and fonner Members first, in satisfaction of liabilities for distributions
and then, in accordance with their Sharing Ratios. Such proceeds shall be paid to such Members within
One Hundred Twenty{ 120) days after the date of winding up.

XII. GENER~L PROVISlONS
12.1 Formation of Companv The Company was fanned as a new venture for the purpose of
acquiring real property for development. There can be no assurance that the real property acquired by the
Company will be able to be developed and sold at a profit. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that
the application of the capital contributions required hereunder and the proceeds of the Loan (if obtained
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by Equity Partners) will be sufficient to cover the acquisition, development, and catTy costs of the real
property acquired and held by the Company.

12.2. Disposition of i\.'lembership Interests Every sale, assignment, transfer, exchange,
mortgage, pledge, grant, hypothecation or other disposition of any ~1£embership [merest shall be made
only upon compliance with this Article. No Membership Interest shall be disposed of if the disposition
would cause a termination of the Company under Sec 708 of the Internal Revenue Code of l 986, as
amended; without compliance with any and all state and federal securities laws and regulations; and
unless the assignee of the Membership lnterests provides the Company with the information and
agreements that the Managers may require in connection with such disposition, including but not limited
to an executed counterpart of this Agreement.
12.2.1 No Member shall be entitled to assign, convey, sell, encumber. or in any way
alienate all or any part of its ~-lembership Interest in the Company and as a Member
except with the prior written consent of a majority in the interest of the non-transferring
Nlembers which consent may be given or withheld, conditioned, or delayed (as allowed
by this Agreement or the Act), as the non-transferring Member~ may detennine in their
sole discretion. Transfers in violation of this pro\'ision shall only be effective to the extent
of an assignment of such interest with only rights set forth in the following provision
"Pem1frted Dispositions\\.
1

12.3 Permitted Dispositions. Subject to the provisions of this Article, a Member may assign
such Member's Membership Interest in the Company in whole or part. The assignment of a Membership
Interest does not in itself entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the Company
or lo become a Member. Such assignee is only entitled to receive, to the extent assigned, the distributions
the assigning Member would otherwise be entitled to, and such assignee shall only become a assignee of a
Membership Interest and not a substitute Member.
12.4 Acknowledgment of Access to Records. Each Member acknowledges that such Member
has been furnished and has reviewed the Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement of the
Company and al amendments, if any, to those documents. Each Membe1 fu1 thcr acknowledges that all
instruments, documents, records, books, and financial infom1ation pertaining to this investment have been
made available for inspection by such Member and it professional advisors and that the books and records
of the Company will be available upon reasonable notice for inspection by such Member during
reasonable business hours at the Company's principal place of business.
12.5 Required Amendments. The Members and Managers will execute and file any
amendments to the Articles required by the Act. If any such amendments results in inconsistencies
between the Articles and this Agreement, this Agreement will be considered to have been amended in the
manner necessary to eliminate the inconsistencies.

12.6 Policies. [n every instance where agreemelll between the members does not exist \Vith
reference to the policies to be followed by the company, the managing members shall have the right to
decide what policy or policies shall be followed and the other member or members shall consider the
decision as final.
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12. 7 Additional Instruments. Each Member will execute and deliver any document or statement
necessary to give effect to the tenns of this Agreement or to comply with any law, rule, or regulation
governing the Company's fonnation and activities.
12.8 Power of Attornev. Each Member appoints each ~·{ember, with full power of substitution,
as the Member's attorney-in-fact, to act in the Member's name and to execute and file (a) all certificates,
applications, reports, and other instruments necessary to qualify or maintain the Company as a limited
liability company in the states and foreign countries where the Company conducts its activities, (bO all
instruments thm effect or confin11 changes or modifications of the Company or its status, including,
without limitation, amendments to the Articles, and;©) all instruments of transfer necessary to effect the
Companf s dissolution and termination. The power of attorney granted by this article is irrevocable,
coupled with an interest, will survive any incapacity of the l\:fember: and shall be binding upon the
Member's successors and assigns.
12. 9 Disputes. [n the event that any dispute should arise conceming any of the terms, covenants
or conditions of this agreement, or with respect the enforcement thereof, or with respect to any dissolution
or liquidation of the Company, or with respect to any matter affecting the operation and conduct of the
business of the Company, such dispute shall be disposed by arbitration by submitting the same to two
indifferent, competent persons in or t.vell acquainted with the trade or business of the company, one to be
chosen by either party, or by an umpire to be chosen by the referees in the usual course in such or similar
cases; and their or his decision shall, in all respects, be final and conclusive on both parties, and sl1all be
given, in writing, within 10 days next after such submission, or within such further time, not exceeding 30
days, as they or he shall require.

12.10 Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire understanding and agreement
among the parties concerning the Company and supersedes any and all prior negotiations, understandings
or agreements in regard thereto.
12.11. Amendment. This Agreement may not be amended nor may any rights hereunder be
waived except by an instrument in writing signed by Members having a Sharing Ratio of more than 50%
in the aggregate.
12.12 Pronouns. References to a Member, including by use of a pronoun, shall be deemed to
include masculine, feminine, singular, plural, individuals, pannerships, corporations or other legal entities
where applicable.
12.13 Severabilitv. [f any provision of this Agreement or the application of such provision to
any Person or circumstance shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Agreement, or the application of
such provision to Persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be
affected.

12. 14 Applicable Law. The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Agreement,
excluding any conflict of laws rules.
12.15 Counterparts. This instrumem may be executed in any number of counterparts each of
\.vhich shall be considered an original.
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12.14 Applicable Law. The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Agreement,
excluding any conflicl of laws rules.

12.15 Counterparts. This instrument m:1y he execmed in :rny numher of counterparts each of
which shall be considered an original.
12.16. Parties and Successors Bound. This agreement shall be binding upon the he? irs.
executors, ndministracors and assigns of the. pan ies hereto and constitutes th~ entire agreement of the
parties hac.10. and may not he amended by the parties except in writing signed by the m:1jority of the
parties.

12.17. Article Headings. The Article hendings and numhers comained in this Operating
Agreement have heen inserted only as a matted of convenience and for reference~ and in no Vi-·ay shall be
construl?d lo defin~. limit, or describe the scope otr intent of any provision of this Operating Agreemen1.
12. 18. Amendment. This Opernting Agreement may he amendt'd or re\'oked al any time hy :1
written agreement executed by all of the p:tnies to this Operating Agreement except where a lesser
rercemage of Membership Interests is permitted elsewhere in this Operating Agreement. No chang~ or
modification 10 this Operaring Agrec'.'ment shall be valid unless in writing and signed by all of rhe parti\:·s
· to this Operating. Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hands and seals the date and year
first ahove writ ten.

EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC

8#-0?

By: _ _~ - - - - - - - - - - - - lts:

.:-:--F)

// >:. ,.,-:! t,~',,( ..-/
BOBBIE M. POSEY

I

,.-,,r>

(/
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FIRST AMENDMENT TO OPERATING AGREE:MENT FOR TIVOLI PROPERTIES,
LLC
A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

"

This First Amendment to Operating Agreement for Tivoli Properties, LLC (this
''Amendment") is made and entered into on November 14, 2007, by and between Equity Partners,
LLC., ("EP") a Utah Limited Liability Company, Ke1Ty Posey and Bobbie Posey, (''Poseys")
individuals, with reference to the following facts:

1.

All capitalized terms not defined in this Amendment will have the meaning
ascribed to them in that certain "Operating Agreement for Tivoli Gardens, LLC" by and between
PEGI and VSI dated as of August 15, 2007 (the "Agreement").
A. The parties formed Tivoli Properties, LLC, a limited liability company organized
under the laws of the State of Utah (the "Company"), and in connection therewith the patties
have entered into the Agreement.

B. The parties desire to adopt and approve the following provisions shall replace
Sections 2.5, 3.1.l. 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 and incorporate them into the Agreement, effective as of the
Effective Date.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual agreements
contained herein, and intending to be legally bound, the parties agree as follows:

I. Amendment to Agreement. Upon execution of this Amendment, the Agreement will be
amended by replacing and inserting the following new provision as Section 3.1.1 thereof:
"3.1.1 Contribution from Equity Partners. Equity ParttJers shall contribute and assign to
the Company all of Equity Partners' right, title, and interest as buyer in, to, and under the
Purchase Agreement and the Company shall assume and shall perform all of Equity Partners
obligations as buyer thereunder. Furthermore, £quit}' Partners ·will arrange for, sign and
guarantee an interim loan in the amount of Seven Hundred•Fifty Thousand Dollars
($750,000.00) which v.,i/l be used as operating capita/for the Company. Additionally, all
amounts paid by Equity Partners pursuant to the entirlement process. Purchase Agreement or
otherwise related to the acquisition and development of the Property. whether paid prior 10 or
after the execurion of rhis Agreement, shall be deemed to be capital contributions made. to the
Company by Equity Partners. As of the dare of this Agreement. rhe aggregate amount of such
deemed capital conrriburion made by Equity Partners to the Company $800,000.00. Once the
Loan is obtained, Equity Partners shall set aside and pay $10,000.00 per n·wnth ro the Sellers
from the operating capital of the Company. As a result of such contribwion, Equity Partners has
been credited \.l-'ith a capital account equal to $800.000.00, and has received 800.000 Class A
Units."
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2. Section 3.1.2 shall be amended by replacing and inserting the following new provision
as Section 3.1.2 thereof:
"3.1.2 Contribution from Kerry R. Posey. Kerry R. Posey shall contribute the carrying costs of
his subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One Hundred
Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($175.000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the
Company by Kerry R. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Kerry R. Posey has been credited
with a capital account equal to $125,000.00. and has received 100,000 Class A Units and 25,000
Class B Units. "

3. Section 3.1.3 shall be amended by replacing and inserting the following new provision
as Section 3.1.2 thereof:
"3.1.3 Contribution from Bobbie M. Posey. Bobbie M.. Posey shall contribute rhe canying
costs of her subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One
Hundred Seventy-five 1110usand Dollars ($175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions
made to the Company by Bobbie M. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Bobbie M. Posey
has been credited with a capital accouJtt equal to $125,000.00, and has received 100,000 Cl<t,·s
A Units and 25,000 Class B Units."
4. Section 2.5 shall be amended by replacing and inserting the following new provision

as Section 2.5 thereof:
2.5. Fiscal year, accounting. The Company's.fiscal year shall be the calendar year. the
particular accounting methods and principals to be followed by the Company shall be selected
by the accountant for the Company ("Accountant") who is hereby designated as Dallas Cooke,
CPA as the independent CPA finn. The CPA Accountant may be changed by wrillen Notice of
the then serving Manager, consemed to in writing by at least Two (2) Members.

5. Other Terms. Except as otherwise provided herein, all other terms and conditions of
the Agreement will remain in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused their duly authorized officers to
execute this Amendment, effective as of the Effectiv~WJ1f!2.,

p__~
_____Title:

EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC. By: /s/ Allan Bruun --1-Q!J_....p.,L_W
___
Memb~
'

KERRY R. POSEY. By: Isl Kerry R. Posey
Individual

.:l
,£('7} £ J-"d2~

BOBBIE M. POSEY, By: Isl Bobbie M. Posey
Individual

~lf.u,

f

~
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THE MEMBERSHIP INTERESTS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THIS
AGREEMENT MAY UNDER FEDERAL LAWS AND THE LAWS OF VARIOUS
STATES BE CONSIDERED SECURITIES. IN THAT LIGHT. THE MEMBERSHIP
INTERESTS (A) HA VE NOT BEEN REGISTERED OR QUALIFIED UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. AS AMENDED, OR UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF
ANY STATE, AND WILL BE OFFERED AND SOLD IN RELIANCE ON EXEMPTIONS
FROM THE REGISTRATION REQUIRElvtENTS OF THESE LAWS BY VIRTUE OF
THE COMPANY'S INTENDED COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 4(2) OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. AS AMENDED. THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION D
UNDER SUCH ACT. AND SIMILAR EXEMPTIONS UNDER STATE LAW; (8) MAY
BE PURCHASED FOR INVESTMENT ONLY; AND (C) MAY NOT BE SOLD.
OFFERED FOR SALE. PLEDGED. OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF (1) UNLESS SO
REGISTERED OR QUALIFIED OR UNLESS AN EXEMPTION FROM THE
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF SUCH ACTS APPLIES TO SUCH
DISPOSITION. THE AVAILABILITY OF WHICH IS ESTABLISHED BY AN OPINION
OF COUNSEL. WHICH OPINION AND COUNSEL ARE REASONABLY
SATISFACTORY TO THE MANAGER, AND (2) UNLESS THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE 6 OF THIS OPERATING AGREEMENT RELATED THERETO ARE
SATISfIED. ACCORDINGLY. HOLDERS OF THESE MEMBERSHlP INTERESTS
INDEFINITE PERIOD. THE SECURITIES HA VE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR
DISAPPROVED BY ANY REGULATORY AUTHORITY. ANY REPRESENTATION
TO THE CONTRARY IS UNLAWFUL.
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~ DISTRICT COURT
OPENING INSTRUCTIONS TO T H E , d Judlclal District

NOV 14 2013

INTRODUCTION:

SALTUKE COUNTY.

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, you have been selected
case. The defendant is accused of committing certain crimes.

ftit1 sWom as me JUI}'EIQnb~lerk

You will decide if the defendant

is guilty or not guilty. I will give you some instructions now and some later. You are required
to consider and follow all my instructions.

Keep an open mind throughout the trial. At the end

of the trial you will discuss the evidence and reach a verdict. You took an oath to "well and

truly try the ~ssues pending between the parties" and to "render _a true and just verdict" The oath
is your promise to do your duty as a member of the jury. Please be alert, pay attention and
follow all my instructions:

INFORMATION, PLEA AND BURDEN OF PROOF:
The prosecution has filed a document - called an "Information" -

that contains ihe

charges against the defendant The Information is not evidence of anything. It is only a
method of accusing a defendant of the crimes. The Information will now be reaci.
(Read the Information)
The defendant has entered pleas of not guilty and denies committing the crimes. Every .

crime has component parts called "elements". The prosecution must prove each and every
element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt

Until the prosecution has satisfied that

burden, you must presume that the defendant is not guilty.
prove anything.

The defendant does not have to

He/she does not have to testify, call witnesses, or present evidence.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE:
Remember, the fact that the defendant is charged with the crimes is n~t evidence of guilt.
The law presumes that the defendant is n<?t guilty of the crimes charged. This presumption
persists unless the prosecution's_evidence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty.
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ROLE OF THE JUDGE, JURY AND LAWYERS:
All of us, judge, jury and lawyers, are officers of the court and have different roles during
the trial:

*

As the judge I will supervise the trial, decide legal issues, and instruct you on the
law.

*

As the jury, you must follow the law as you weigh the evidence and decide the
factual issues. Factual issues relate to what did, or did not, happen in this case.

•

The lawyers will present evidence and try to persuade you to decide the case one
way or the other.

Neither the lawyers nor I decide the case.

That is your role. Do not be influenced by

what you think our opinions might be. Make your decision based on the law given in _my·

,

instructions and on the evidence presented in court.

NOTE-TAIONG:
Feel free to t.akes notes during the trial to help you remember the evidence but let me
give you the following caution:

*

Do not let note-taking distract you from the proceedings or cause you to miss
testimony presented.

*

You should not view your notes as authoritative record of the evidence presented.
Your notes are not evidence and may be incomplete. Your memory should be
your greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate.

ORDER OF THE TRIAL:
I will now explain to you how the trial will unfold.

The prosecution will give its

opening statement. An opening statem~nt gives an overview of the case from one point of view,
and summarizes what that lawyer thinks the evidence will show. Defense counsel may choose

Page 2 of 5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to make an opening statement right after the prosecutor, or wait until after all the prosecution's
evidence has been presented, or not make one at all. Next, you will the hear the prosecution's
evidence.

Evidence is usually presented by calling and questioning witnesses. What the

witnesses say is testimony. A witness is questioned first by the lawyer who called that witness.
This is called direct examination. After direct examination, the witness will be questioned by
the opposing lawyer. This is called cross-examination.
Consider all testimony,. whether from direct or cross-examination, regardless of who calls
the witness. After the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant may present ·
evidence, although the defendant has no duty to _do so. If the defendant does present evidence,
the prosecution may then present additional evidence. After both sides haye presented all their
evidence, I will give you final instructions on the law you must follow in reaching a verdict
You will then hear closing arguments from the lawyers. The prosecutor will speak first followed
by defense counsel. Then prosecutor speaks last because the government has the burden of
. proof. Finally, you will deliberate in the jwy room. You may take your notes with yplL. You
will discuss the case and reach a verdict.

7.

CONDUCT OF JURORS:
From time to time I will call a recess. It may be for a few minutes or longer. During

recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone- not family, not fiiends, not even each other.
Until the trial is over, do not mingle or talk with the lawyers, parties, witnesses or anyone else
connected with the case.

You are welcome to talk with other members of the jury panel but do

not discuss this case, any matters discussed in court, or anyone involved in this case. Our court
clerks and bailiffs can answer general questions, such as the length of breaks or location of
restrooms.

But they cannot comment about the case or anyone involved in the case. The goal

is to avoid the impression that anyone is trying to influence you improperly. If people involved

in the

case seem to ignore you outside of court, they are just following this instruction.

Do not conduct any inaependent research or investigation of any issue involving this
case. This includes but is not limited to the following: Do hot visit or view any alleged location,
do not do any research on the internet, do not read any articles, law books, dictionaries or other
documents other than what is presented to you in court.

Do not let anyone else do this for you.
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Until the trial is over, do not read or listen to any news reports about this case. If you
observe anytbjng that seems to violate this instruction, report it immediately to a clerk or-bailiff.

8.

FURTHER ADMONITION REGARDING ELECTRONIC DEVICES.
Serious problems have been caused around the country by jurors using computer and

electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigat~ a case, or to share
with others our thoughts about the trial, and it's easy to do so with the internet and instant
communication devices or services, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so
on.
However, please understand that the rules of evidence and procedure have developed
over hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution C?f disputes. The fairness of the
entire system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your decisions based on evidence
presented to you in court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as
jurors if you conduct your own investigations or communicate about this trial with others:;
Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling"
the parties, issues, or counsel; "Twittering"'with fiiends about the trial; using Blackberries or
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial updates on Facebook pages; using
Wikipedia or other internet information sources, and so on. Even using something as seemingly
innocent as "Google Maps" can result in a mistrial.
Post-trial investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they
are discovered, they will be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to be retried,

at substantial cost.
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror.
So I must warn you again - do not use your cellphone or computer to investigate or
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completely finished. Do no internet research
of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so.

CONFERENCES WI COUNSEL:
During the course of this trial, the attorneys and I will often meet before court starts or
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during the recesses. Sometimes, these meetings will go beyond the time we are scheduled to

start. I want to assure you, when that happens; we are not being inconsiderate of the
importance of your time. To the contrary, every conference I have w/ counsel is necessary to
simplify the issues of the trial, to expedite this case so it may be brought to a timely conclusion

and most importantly to ensure matters are handled in a fair and just manner. Please accept my
apologies in advance for any delay that may occur in our starting time.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

ro

CLOSING ROADMAP:
Members of the jury, you now have all the evidence. Three things remain
to be done:
First, I will give you additional instructions that you will follow in deciding
this case.
Second, the lawyers will give their closing arguments. The prosecutor will
go first, then the defense. Because the prosecution has the burden of proof, the
prosecutor may give a rebuttal argument.
Finally, you will go to the jury room. to discuss and decide the case.
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INSTRUCTION NO . ..,.._\_/_

JUROR DUTIES:
You have two main duties as jurors.
The first is to decide from the evidence what the facts are. Deciding what
the facts.are is your job, not mine.
The second duty is to take the law I have given you and will now give you in
th~ instructions, apply it to the facts, and decide if the prosecution has proved the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
You are bou_nd by your oath to follow the instructions that I give you, even if
you personally disagree with them. This includes the instructions I g~ve you
before the trial, any instructions I may have given to you during the trial, and .these
instructions I give to you now. All instructions are important, and you shoul4
consider them as a whole. The order in which the instructions are given does· not
mean that some instructiops are more important than others. Whether any
particular instruction applies may depend upon what you decide ~e the true facts
of the case. If an instruction applies only to facts or circumstances you find do not
exist, you may disregard that instruction.
Perform your duties fairly. Do.not let any bias, sympathy or prejudice that
you may feel toward one side or the other influence your decision in any way.
You must also not let yourself be influenced by public opinion or what you may
perceive as public opinion regarding any decision you make.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 2

EVIDENCE:
You must base your decision only on the evidence that you saw and heard
here in court.

Evidence includes:

*
*
*
*

what the witnesses said while they were testifying under oath;
any exhibits admitted into evidence;
any facts to which the parties stipulated, that is to say, facts to which
they agreed;
any facts of which I took asjudici~ notice and told you to accept as
true.
{

Nothing else is evidence. The lawyers' statements and arguments are not
evidence. Their objections are not evidence. My legal rulings and comments, if
any, are not evidence.
·
In reaching a verdict, consider all the evidence as I have defined it here, and
nothing else. You may also draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence .

.

·-...
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INSTRUCTION NO.

(

\3

DIRECT AND/OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE:
Facts.may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The law does not
treat one type of evidence as better than the other.
Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. It usually comes from a witness
who perceived firsthand the fact in question. For example, if a witness testified he
looked outside and saw it raining, that would be direct evidence that it.had rained.
Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence. It usually comes from a ·
witness who perceived a set of related events, but not the fact in question. For
example, if a witness testified she looked outside and saw the ground was wet and
people were closing their umbrellas, that would be circumstantial evidence that it
had rained.
· -~
Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge, there must be
enough evidence - direct, circumstantial, or both - to convince you of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is up to you to decide.
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INSTRUCTION NO.~

LEGAL RULINGS:
During the trial I have made certaix?. rulings. I made these rulings based on
the law, and not because I favor one side or the other.
However,

*

*
*

if I sustained the objection,
if I did not accept evidence offered by one side or the other, or
if I ordered that certain testimony be stricken,

then you must not consider those things in reaching your verdict.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

15

JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY:
As the judge, I am neutral. If I have said or done anything that makes you
think I favor one side or1he other, that was not my intention. Do not interpret
anything I have said or done as indicating that I have any particular view of the
evidence or the decision you should reach.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,, ...

-

. .....

,,----.""
~

.\

}

INSTRUCTION NO.

-J-b--

CLOSING ARGUMENTS:
When the lawyers give their closing arguments, keep in mind that they are
advocating .their views of the case. What they say during their closing arguments
is not evidence. If the lawyers say something about the evidence that conflicts
with what you remember, you are to rely on your memory of the evidence. If they
say anything about the law that conflicts with these instructions, you are to rely on
these instructions.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

,:

-[I_

DO NOT CONSIDER PUNISHMENT:
~

In making your decision, do not consider what punishment could result from
a verdict of guilt. Your duty is to decide if the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Punishment is not relevant to whether the defendant is guilty or
not guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

l~

WI1NESS CREDIBILITY:

In deciding this case, you will need to decide how believable each witness is.
Use your judgment and common sense. Let me suggest a few things to think
about as you weigh each witness's testimony:

*
*
*

*
*
·*

*
*

How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise
observe what the witness testified about?
Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this case?
Does the witness have any connection to the people involved in this
case?
Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant the testimony?
Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not, is ther.e a
good reason for the inconsistency? If the witness was inconsist~nt,
was it about something important or unimportant?
·
How believable was the witness's ~estimony in light of other evidence
presented at trial?
How believable was the witness's testimony in light of human
experience?
Was there anything about the way the witness testified that-made the
testimony more or less believable?

In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, you may also consider
anything else you think is important.
You do not have to believe everything that a witness said. You may believe
part and disbelieve the rest. On the other hand, if you are convinced that a witness
has lied, you may disbelieve anything the witness said. In other words, you may
believe all, or part, or none of a witness•~ testimony. You may believe many
witnesses against one or one witness against many.
In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember that no one's
memory is perfect. Anyone can make an honest mistake. Honest people may
remember the same event differently.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ( 0,

DEFENDANT TESTIFYING:
The defendant testified at trial. Another instruction mentions things for you
to think about in weighing testimony. Consider those same things and any others
that you think are important in weighing the defendant's testimony. Don't reject
the defendant's testimony merely because he/she is accused of a crime.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

20

DEFENDANT NOT TESTIFYING:
A person accused of a crime may choose whether or not to testify. Do not
hold that choice against the defendant. Do not try to guess why the defendant
chose not to testify. Do not consider it in your deliberations. You must decide
this case only on the basis of the evidence. The defendant does not have to prove
that he/she is not guilty. The prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt:
·
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INSTRUCTION NO.

(

-i 1

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S TESTIMONY:

You have heard the testimony of a law enforcement officer. The fact that a
witness is employed in law enforcement does not mean that his/her testimony
deserves more or less consideration than that of any other witness. It is up to you
to give any witness's testimony whatever weight you think it deserves.
L.J~

VP

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

...-.....

,.-....

.

.

f·:::;

\

I

!-~

INSTRUCTION NO.

22

SEPARATE CONSIDERATION OF MULTIPLE CR.Ilv.IBS:
The defendant has been charged with more than one crime. It is your duty
to consider each charge separately. For each crime charged, consider all of the
evidence related to that charge. Decide whether the prosecution has presented
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that crime. Your
verdict on one charge does not determine your verdict on any other charge.
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PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE:
Remember, the fact that the defendant is charged with a crime is not
evidence of guilt. The law presumes that the defendant is not guilty of the crimes
charged. This presumption persists unless the prosecution's evidence convinces ·
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
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REASONABLE DOUBT:
As I instructed you before, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as
jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a
fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the State's proof must be
mor~ powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced
of the defendant's guilt There are very few things in this world that we lmow
with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that
overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence,
you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you
must find him/her guilty. If on the other hand, you think there a real possi\)ility
that the defendant is not guilty, you must give the defendant the benefit of the·
doubt and find him/her not guilty.
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OFFENSE REQUIRES CONDUCT AND MENTAL STATE:

A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless that person's
conduct is ·prohibited by law, AND at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant
demonstrated a particular mental state specified by law.
"Conduct" can mean both an "act" or a failure to act when the law requires a
person to act An "act" is a voluntary movement of the body and it can include
speech.
As to the "mental state" requirement, the prosecution must prove that at the
time the defendant acted (or failed to act), he/she did so with a particular mental
state. For each offense, the law defines what kind of mental state the defendant
had to have, if any. For some crimes the defendant.must have acted 'interitioJially"
or "knowingly". For other crimes it is enough that the defendant acted
·
"recklessly", "with criminal negligence" or with some other specified mental state.

Later, I will instruct you on the specific conduct and mental state that the
prosecution must prove before the defendant can be found guilty of the crime(s)
charged.
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INFERRING THE REQUIRED MENTAL STATE:
The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant acted with a particular mental state.
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state can be proven
directly, because no one can tell what another person is thinking.
. A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the surrounding
facts and circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, what
the defendant did, and ahy other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's
mind.
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MOTIVE:
A defendant's mental state is not the same as "motive". Motive is why a
person does something. Motive is not an element of the crime(s) charged in this
case. As a result, the pr-osecutor does not have to prove why the defendant acted
(or failed to act).
However, motive or lack of motive may help you determine if the defendant
did what he/she is charged with doing. It may also help you determine what
his/her mental state was at the time.
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FACT VS. EXPERT WITNESS:

There are two types of witnesses: fact witnesses and expert witnesses.
Usually a fact witness can testify only about facts that he/she can see, hear, touch ,
taste or smell. An expert witness has scientific, technical or other special
knowledge that allows the witness to give an opinion. An expert's knowledge can
come from training, education, experience or skill. An expert can testify about
facts, and they can give their opinions in their area of expertise.

In weighing the opinion of an expert, you may look at their qualifications,
the reasoning process the expert used, and the overall credibility of their
:testimony. You may also look at things like bias, consistency, and reputation.
Use your common sense in evaluating all witnesses including any expert
witness. You do not have to accept an expert's opinion. You may accept it all,
reject it all, or accept part and reject part. Give it whatever weight you think it
deserves.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count One of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1006).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count One of the
Criminal Information.

If you bel.ieve that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count One.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count One of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:

1.

Commencing on or about December 2007,

in the State of

Utah,· ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;
2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

That value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1006).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count One of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count One.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Two of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the p~rpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1007).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Two of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Two.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Two of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1007).
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and

every one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it
shall be your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Two of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Two.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Three of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1012).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Three of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Three.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Three of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1012).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Three of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Three.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Four of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3•

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1015).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt,

it shall be

your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Four of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Four.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Four of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2•

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1015).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Four of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Four.

U.C.A. §76-6-404
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Five of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2•

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1016).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Five of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Five.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Five of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1016).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Five of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Five.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Six of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is less than $500.00 {Check
#1017).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Six of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Six.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Six of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is less than $500.00 (Check

#1017).
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Six of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Six.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Seven of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey} thereof;

3•

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1018}.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Seven of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Seven.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Seven of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008,

in the State of

Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;
2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1018).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond ·a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Seven of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Seven.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Eight of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey} thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1019}.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Eight of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Eight.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Eight of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1019).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Eight of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged-in Count Eight.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Nine of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1021).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Nine of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Nine.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Nine of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1021).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Nine of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Nine.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Ten of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1027).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
· one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Ten of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Ten.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of

THEFT

as alleged in

Count Ten

of the Criminal

Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 {Check #1027).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Ten of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Ten.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twelve of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2•

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is less than $500.00 (Check
#1024).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twelve of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twelve.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of

THEFT

as alleged in

Count Twelve

of the Criminal

Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 200-S, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3•

The value of the property is less than $500.00 (Check
#1024).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twelve of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twelve.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Thirteen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is less than $500.00 {Check
#1025).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Thirteen
of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence

has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Thirteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Thirteen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is less than $500.00 (Check
#1025).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Thirteen of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Thirteen.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO.

,53

In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Fifteen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008,

in the State of

Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;
2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1029).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Fifteen of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Fifteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Fifteen of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1029).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Fifteen of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Fifteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Sixteen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1030).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Sixteen of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Sixteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Sixteen of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about January 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is
less than $1,500.00

(Check #1030).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Sixteen of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Sixteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Seventeen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1034).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Seventeen
of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence

has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond
a reasonable doubt,

it shall be your duty to find the Defendant

not guilty of the crime charged in Count Seventeen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Seventeen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1034).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Seventeen of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Seventeen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Eighteen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1035).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Eighteen
of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence

has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Eighteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Eighteen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about December 2007, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
{Check #1035) .

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Eighteen of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Eighteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Nineteen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about February 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1041).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Nineteen
of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence

has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Nineteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Nineteen of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about February 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1041}.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Nineteen of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Nineteen.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about February 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1042) .

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty.
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In order for you to find the Defendant,

ALL.AN BRUUN,

guilty

of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty of the Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence presented all of the
following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about February 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1042).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty of the
Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-One of
the

Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence

presented all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about March 2oo"a, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1047).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-One
of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence

has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-One.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-One of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about March 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1047) .

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-One of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-One.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Two of
the

Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence

presented all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about March 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1098).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-Two
of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence

has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Two.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Two of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about March 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
{Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 {Check #1098).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Two of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Two.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Three of
the

Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence

presented all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1049).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count TwentyThree of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the

evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count TwentyThree.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Three of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1049).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
~.•

one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Three of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Three.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Four of
the

Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence

presented all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1051).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count TwentyFour of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the

evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count TwentyFour.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Four of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1051).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Four of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Four.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Five of
the

Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence

presented all of the following evidence of the crime:

1.

Commencing on or about May 2008, in the State of Utah,
JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1055).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count TwentyFive of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the

evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count TwentyFive.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Five of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about April 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3•

The value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.00
(Check #1055).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Five of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Five.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Six of
the

Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence

presented all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about May 2008, in the State of Utah,
JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised unauthorized

~

control over the property of another;
2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

v9
3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1062).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-Six
of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence

has failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant
not guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Six.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Six of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about May 2008, in the State of Utah,
ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized control
over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $1,500.00 but
is less than $5,000.00 (Check #1062).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Six of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Six.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Seven of
the

Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence

presented all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about June 2008, in the State of Utah,
JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1066).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count TwentySeven of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the

evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count TwentySeven.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Seven of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about June 2008, in the State of Utah,
ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized control
over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1066).

· If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Seven of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Seven.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO.

7"J

In order for you to find the Defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON,
guilty of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Eight of
the

Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence

presented all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about September 2008, in the State of
Utah, JAMES DIDERICKSON obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is
less than $1,500.00 {Check #1070).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find JAMES DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count TwentyEight of the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the

evidence has failed to establish one of more of the above
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find
the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count TwentyEight.
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In order for you to find the Defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty
of the crime of THEFT as alleged in Count Twenty-Eight of the
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence presented
all of the following evidence of the crime:
1.

Commencing on or about September 2008, in the State of
Utah, ALLAN BRUUN obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another;

2.

That he did so with the purpose to deprive another
(Kerry and Bobbie Posey) thereof;

3.

The value of the property is or exceeds $500.00 but is
less than $1,500.00 (Check #1070).

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find ALLAN BRUUN guilty as to Count Twenty-Eight of
the Criminal Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one of more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Eight.
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Before you can find the defendant, JAMES DIDERICKSON, guilty
of the crime of PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY as alleged in Count
Twenty-Nine of the Criminal Information, you must find from the
evidence all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

From on or about May 2007, in the State of Utah;

2.

James Diderickson;

3.

Purposefully;

4.

Through a pattern of unlawful activity;
a. in which James Diderickson participated as a
principal;
i.

received any proceeds directly or indirectly;
AND

ii. used or invested, directly or indirectly, any
part of the income or proceeds of the income,
which he received from the specified unlawful
activity to acquire, establish or operate an
enterprise; OR,
b.

acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of an enterprise; OR,

c

was employed by or associated with any enterprise
and conducted or participated, directly or
indirectly, in the conducting of that enterprise's
affairs;

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable
doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant JAMES
DIDERICKSON guilty as to Count Twenty-Nine of the Criminal
Information.

On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to

establish one or more of the above elements of the offense
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find
the defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count TwentyNine.
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Before you can find the defendant, ALLAN BRUUN, guilty of
the crime of PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY as alleged in Count
Twenty-Nine of the Criminal Information, you must find from the

evidence all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

From on or about May 2007, in the State of Utah;

2.

Allan Bruun;

3.

Purposefully;

4.

Through a pattern of unlawful activity;
a. in which Allan Bruun participated as a principal;
i.

received any proceeds directly or indirectly;
AND

ii. used or invested, directly or indirectly, any
part of the income or proceeds of the income,
which he received from the specified unlawful
activity to acquire, establish or operate an
enterprise; OR,
b.

acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of an enterprise; OR,

c

was employed by or associated with any enterprise
and conducted or participated, directly or
indirectly, in the conducting of that enterprise's
affairs;

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable
doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant ALLAN BRUUN
guilty as to Count Twenty-Nine of the Criminal Information.

On

the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or
more of the above elements of the offense charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-Nine.
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You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah,
the following words have the following meanings:
1.

"Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship,

partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associatd in
fact although not a legal entity, and includes illegal as well as
legal entitites.
2

"Pattern of Unlawful Activity" means engaging in

conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three
episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated,
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics.

Taken together, the episodes

shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related
either to each other or to the enterprise.

The most recent act

constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activity as defined
shall have occurred within 5 years of the commission of the next
preceeding act alleged as part of the pattern.
3.

"Person" includes any individual or entity capable of

holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, including
state, county, and local governmental entities.
4.

"Entity" includes a domestic and foreign corporation, a

nonprofit corporation, a limited liability company, a profit or
non-profit unincorporated association, a business trust, an
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estate, a partnership, a trust, two or more persons having a
joint or common economic interest.
5.

"Unlawful Activity" means to directly engage in conduct

or to solicit, request, command, encourage or intentionally aid
another person to engage in conduct which would constitute an act
of Theft, as defined in Counts 1 through 10, 12 through 13, and
15 through 28 above, or to attempt or conspire to engage in an
act which would constitute that offense, regardless of whether
the act is in fact charged or indicted by any authority.
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You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah
a person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense
which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on
behalf of a corporation or association to the same extent as if
such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.
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You are instructed that "purpose to deprive" means to have
the conscious object:
a.

To withhold property permanently or for so extended a

period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial
portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof,
would be lost; or,
b.

To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or

other compensation; or,
c.

To dispose of the property under circumstances that make

it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
You are instructed that "purpose to deprive" may be inferred
from actions and surrounding circumstances and may be found at
any time in which an actor exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another.
You are instructed that "obtain" means in relation to
property ... 11 to bring about a transfer of possession or of some
other legally recognized interest in property, whether to the
obtainer or to another ... "
You are instructed that "property of another" can include
property of a limited liability corporation.
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You are inctructed that it is not a defense that an actor
has an interest in the property obtained, if another person also
has an interest that actor is not entitled to infringe.
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You are instructed that if one misappropriates and converts
to his own use money or property belonging to another under
circumstances that constitute theft, it is not made otherwise
because the one doing so might have some intention of restoring
the loss sometime.

And such an act is not prevented from being

theft merely because the actor says that he or she had such an
intention .

.

· .,,;·:-····
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JURY DELIBERATIONS:
When you go into the jury room to deliberate, discuss the evidence and
speak your minds to each other. Open discussion should help you reach a
unanimous agreement on a verdict. Listen carefully and respectfully to each
other's views and keep an open mind about what others have to say. I recommend
that you not commit yourselves to a particular verdict before discussing all the
evidence.
Try to reach unanimous agreement, but only if you can do so honestly and in
good conscience. If there is a difference of opinion about the evidence or the
verdict, do not hesitate to change your mind if you become convinced that your
position is wrong. On the other hand, do not give up your honestly held views
about the evidence simply to agree on a verdict, to give in to pressure froni otµer
jurors, or just to get the case over with. In the end your vote must be your own.

Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must agree with the
verdict before the defendant can be .found "guilty" or "not guilty". In reaching
your verdict you may not use methods of chance, such as drawing straws or
flipping a GOin. Rather, the verdict must reflect your individual, careful, and
conscientious judgment as to whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor
proved each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
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· FOREPERSON SELECTION AND DUTIES:

Among the first things you should do when you go to the jury room to
deliberate is to appoint someone to serve as the jury foreperson. The foreperson
should not dominate the jury discussion, but rather should facilitate the discussion
of the evidence and make sure that all ·members of the jwy get a chance to speak.
The foreperson's opinions should be given the same weight as those of other
members of the jury. Once the jury has reached a unanimous verdict, the
foreperson is responsible for filling out and signing the verdict form(s) on behalf of
the entire juzy.
For each charge the verdict form will have two blan1cs- one for "guilty" and
the other for "not guilty". The foreperson will fill in the appropriate blank to .
reflect the jury's unanimous decision. In filling out the form, the foreperson p.eecls
to make sure that only one blank is marked for each charge. When your verdlct(s)
has/have been found, please notify the bailiff.
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SETTLEiVIENT AGREEJ.\tIENT AL'lD RELEASE
TIIlS SETTLElvIENT AGREENIBNT AND RELEASE ("Settlement Agreement") is made and
entered into by and among Kerry Posey and Bobbie Posey, individuals (the ''Poseys"); Equity Partners
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and Four Winds Dev~lopment Group, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, as the sole member and manager of Equity Partners, LLC (collectively referred to as
''Equity Partners"); Four Winds Development Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, James
Didericksen, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC,
Allan Bruun, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC,
and Guy Anderson, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group,
LLC (collectively referred to as "Four Winds and Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company, Equity Partners, LLC, as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, Kerry Posey, as a member of
Tivoli Prope!fies, LLC, Bobbie Posey as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, and Vladamir Canro, as
an individual and as the manager ofTivoli Properties, LLC (collectively referred to as "Tivoli''); and
collectively referred to as the '~Parties."
1

11
);

RECITALS
WHEREAS, up to the fall of 2007, the Poseys owned approximately thirty acres of real property
located at 7916 North 10800 West, Saratoga Springs, Utah, 84045, and more particularly described in
the legal descrip~ons attached hereto as Exhibit A (the 'cproperty''); and

WHEREAS, as members of a newly created Utah limited liability company {Tivoli Properties,
LLC), the Poseys and Equity Partners entered into an agreement to develop the Property for the
anticipated mutual benefit of the Poseys and Equity Partners; and
WHEREAS, at a real estate closing held on or about November 16, 2007, in exchange for a cash
payment and the agreement of Equity Partners to provide the Poseys with a third lien position in the
Property, the Poseys conveyed title to the Property to Equity Partners, LLC; and
WHEREAS, due to declining real estate and financial markets, and also due to growing distrust,
dissatisfaction and disappointment between the Parties, the Parties have chosen now to part ways, and
by this Settlement Agreement have arrived at what each believes to be an agreeable resolution and
settlement of all claims, disputes and defenses the Parties have or may have with respect to each other.
NOW THEREFORE, in order to memorialize their resolution and settlement, the Parties hereby
enter into this following Settlement Agreement upon the following terms:

TERl\tfS
l. Settlement Payment: Equity Partners shall receive a lump sum Settlement Payment in the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand dollars ($25,000.00). The Settlement Payment shall be made as a
transfer from Premier Title Company's escrow account to an account, or accounts, designated by Equity
Partners within forty-eight hours after the execution of this Settlement Agreement
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2. Transfer of Propertv: Equity Partners shall execute a Quit Claim Deed in favor of the Poseys,
as Grantees, for the Property. The Quit Claim Deed descn'bed in this paragraph has been approved by
the Poseys, and is cUITeotly being held by Premier Title Company. The Quit Claim Deed will be
recorded by Premier Title Company within forty eight•hours after the execution of this Settlement
Agreement.
3. Release of Claims and Liabilitv: The Parties mutually release, cancel, forgive and forever
discharge each other, and each of their predecessors, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates and divisions, and
all of their officers, members, directors and employees from all actions, claims, demands, damages,
obligations, liabilities, controversies and executions, of any kind or nature whatsoever, whether known
or unknown, which have arisen, or which may have arisen, or which may arise by reason of money
received, management of funds, management actions or payments made, as designated and descn'bed in
the Tivoli Properties, LLC, Operating Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Agreement associated
with the Property, as managers buyers, sellers, consultants,.agents, employees, representatives, owners,
members, affiliates, contractors, associates, or any other affiliated operative from the first day of the
world, including this day and each day hereafter. This release of claims includes, but is not limited to,
the paymen1s to and receipts by the persons and entities identified on the schedule of Questioned
Payments attached hereto as Exhibit B.
1

4. Global /Comprehensive Release: The Parties specifically waive any claim or right to assert
any cause of action or alleged case of action which bas, through oversight or error, intentionally or
unintentionally, and whether by mutual or unilateral mistake, been omitted from this Settlement
Agreement
5. A!!'reement to Execute Additional Documents to Carry Out Settlement: The Parties
will execute any and all other documents as reasonably necessary to implement the terms and effecting
the purposes of this Settlement Agreement.

6. Pavment of Attornevs' Fees and Costs: Each Party is responsible for his/her/its own
attorneys' fees and costs associated with resolution of the issues and transactions to which this
Settlement Agreement pertains, including but not limited to negotiating, drafting and entering into this
Settlement Agreement, and for any subsequent documents and actions necessary and appropriate for
implementing the terms and effecting the purposes of this Settlement Agreement.
7. Confidentialitv: Except as necessary to the conduct or protection of their legitimate business
interests or as may be required by operation of law or order of court, the Parties covenant to hold the
terms, conditions and performance of this Settlement Agreement in confidence and to refrain from
discussing their dispute or its resolution with other persons not a party to this Settlement Agreement,
except as necessary or appropriate with their legal and financial professionals.

8. No Actual or Implied Admission: This Settlement Agreement is not to be construed as an
admission or acknowledgment of any wrongdoing, fault or liability by any Party to any other Party, or to
any third person or entity not party to this Settlement Agreement; and each Party hereby expressly
denies any such wrongdoing, fault or liability.

2
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9. Severabilitv: If any provision of this Settlement Agreement or the application thereof
to any person, entity, or circumstance shall, for any reason and to any extent, be found invalid or
unenforceable, neither the remainder of this Settlement Agreement nor the application of such provision
to any other person, entity, or circumstance shall be affected thereby= but rather shall be enforced to the
greatest extent possible.
10. Default and Attomevs' Fees and Costs: In the event of breach or default hereunder,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other party all expenses, costs, and attorneys'
fees incurred in connection with determining, protecting or enforcing their rights, including lay and
expert witness fees, whether such expenses would be recoverable as costs and attorneys' fees in the
original action or not
11. Jurisdiction. Venue. and Governing: law: Jurisdiction and Venue shall exist only in
the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State ofUtah for any action in regard ta this Settlement
Agreement. This Settlement Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the State of Utah.
12. Entire A!lreement: This Settlement Agreement sets forth the entire Settlement
Agreement of the Parties in the settlement of their respective differences. No provision of this
Settlement Agreement may be amended or any right hereto modified or waived except by a written
agreement executed by the Parties.

13. Cooperation in Draftine: the Settlement Aereement: Each Party hereto has
cooperated in establishing the terms of this Settlement Agreement as well as drafting the recitals and
terms of this Settlement Agreement Therefore, if any construction or interpretation is to be made
regarding this Settlement Agreement or any of its Recitals or Terms, the same shall not be
presumptively construed against any Party.
14. Counterparts: This Settlement Agreement may be executed in any number of
counterparts, each of which when so executed shall be deemed to be an original, and all of which when
taken together shall constitute one and the same document

15. Successors and AssifZDs: This Settlement Agreement is binding upon the Parties,
their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, and will inure to the benefit of the
Parties, their heirs, executors, ad.mirustrators, successors, and assigns.
16. Authority to Execute This A£Zreement: Each Party to this Settlement Agreement
hereby represents and warrants to each other Party that he/she/it has the authority and/or has been duly
authorized to execute, be bound to, and deliver this Settlement Agreement.
17. Acknowled2ement: The Parties declare that each has read and understands this Settlement
Agreement. The Parties have executed this Settlement Agreement voluntarily and without being unduly
pressured, under duress or influenced by any statement or representation made by any other Party or by
any person acting on behalf of any other Party, including their counsel. In negotiating, drafting and
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entering into this Agreement, the Parties also acknowledge that they have either been represented, or
have had an opportunity to be represented, by and/or consult with independent counsel of their own
choosing.

Dated:

L;,/;I /tJ e

Dated:

EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC
A UTAH LilvIITED LIABILITY C01'IP ANY

/ / /11 /o 3
--.........,.,------,-----

FOUR W1NDS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC
A UTAHLL.vIITED LIABILITY COMPANY

B~-~-~~~~~~~1.ca~~-(Na~)
~ ,
·
Mdiging Member of Four Winds
Development Group, LLC, its sole member
and manager

<aa

By:

~ef

Guy Anderson I
Its: Managing Member

II_-_L__!-_a_&___

/4./oe;

Dated; _____

Dated:

FOUR WlNDS DEVELOP:MENT GROUP, LLC
A UTAH LilvfITED LIABILITY COMPANY

FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC
A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

II

'

If&~

By:
Allan Bruun

I

Its; Managing Member

Dated:

TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC
A UTAH Lil.\,fITED LIAB IT

11 I, 2 lo~
---7--,------

TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC
A UTAH LL\1ITED LIABil.,lTY COMPANY

By. /Y
~~d
KerryP~y
•

0 • g Member of Four Winds
Development Group, LLC, the sole member
and manager of Equity Partners, LLC, its

P~

~

Its: Member

member

Second Signature Page ofSettlement Agreement 011 Folio-wing Page
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Second Signatzwe Page ofSettlement Agreement

Dated: _

__._l_/-_l.,;;_;l_-~/)...:.:.f_ _ __

Dated:

TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC
A UTAH LlNilTED LIABILITY CO~IPANY

By:

TNOLIPROPERTIES,LLC
A UTAH LMTED LIABILITY COlvfPANY

&£.v tlkaw

Dated:

.,,i!zffe4,/Z? _J2}J}.

By:
Vladamir Canro
Its: Manager

~

Bobbie Posey
·Its: Member

(/

// - / ;;i - I)

il- 08

//-

<j

Dated: _

Br.✓~~~

By:

_...:..:.,I/_-.,_;ltP.=----=0--='8:;..___ _

&dr~ 11?/J<VIT

KenyPo
As an individual

Bobbie Posey

Dated:/~¥~

Datcd: _ _

As an individual

//_-_(/_-_cf3
___

By:

dit~

Allan Bruun
As an individual

//////ere

Dated:

Dated: ----.::;.......,~..:.._..,.:;--=-=-----

By:~

Guy Anders
As an individual

,,::;{__--L--.

fl-

J)...- o~

fbo-, .o .__,Q? .f)

By:
Vlacfirfnir Canro
As an individual

'
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RELEASE OF PERSO;\;AL GL:.\. RA...~TY

This Rei ease

o: Per~onul Guaranty is made this_ day of November: 2008

Whereas~ on or about November 20 2007, Equity Par:ners: LLC exe=uted a J51 Lien
Position Secured Promissory Noce C'Note'~j in rhe amount of $750:000.00;

Whereas: Guy Anderson: AJian Brnun and James D. Dideridcsen cad1 execuced th:!
aforementioned Note Ds pe.sona; g?Jarantors for the same.
Whereas:- Equity Pa.'1:ners: LLC has agreec lo release the property which acts as securi!}:
for the pmmi5.sory note and to convey the same to Kerry and Bobbi:! Posey in exchange
for d1e release of the personnl guaranties described a:>ove and the payment of $25-,000.00~

and
\Vhereas Dry Creek S~uctures: LLC is the curren: hoider of the Note.

NOW THEREFORE: in exchange for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and vaiuable
consideration: Dry Creek Structures, LLC hereby releeses the personal guar~,tie~ of the
1st Lien Position Secured Promissory Note provided by Guy Anderson: Alhm Brum: and
James D. Didericlcsen. AH remaining terms and conditions of the Note shall re:r.ain in
full force and effect
EXCUTED on the dates subscribed above.

DR~Il::~ucTIJR.S 'LLC

By(-·

I-~

'\

Its:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

-
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EXIDBIT "A''
(Legal_ Description)
Parcel 1:
Commencing at a point located South 867.08 feet and East 56.12 feet from the North quarter comer of
Section 23, Township 5 South, Range 1 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees
56' 3211 East along an existing fence line 392.28 feet; South 89 degrees S7'57" East along an existing
fence line 753.09 feet; thence South 197.62 feet; thence South 89 degrees 49'19" West partially along a
fence line and fence line extension 1145.68 feet; thence North 00 degrees 05'14'' East along East right of
way line of Redwood Road 201.24 feet to point of beginning.

Tax Serial No.: 58-035-0029

Parcel 2:
Commencing East along Section line 60.69 feet and South 867.58 feet from the North quarter comer of
Section 23, Township 5 South, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence East2853.03 feet;
thence South 42 degrees 41 • West 667.20 feet to a fence; thence North 89 degrees 4T West along said
fence line 2404.35 feet to a fence intersection; thence North 26' East along fence line 481.46 feet to the
beginning,
.
and excluding the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah:
Commencing at apoint located South 867.08 feet East 56.12 feet from the North quarter comer of
Section 23, Township S South, Range I West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees
56932" East along an existing fence line 39228 feet; thence South 89 degrees 57'51" East along an
existing fence line 753.09 feet; thence South 197.62 feet; thence South 89 degrees 49'19" West partially
along a fence line and fence line extension 1145.68 feet; thence North 00 degrees 05'14" East along East
Right of Way line of Redwood Road 201.24 feet to point of beginning.

·Tax Serial No.: 58-035-0030
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Unexplained Payments
:~

Related Entities

Four Winds Development
Granite Builders
Geosystems
U.S. General Construction
Construction Advisors
TOTAL:
Related Persons

Guy Anderson
Jim Didericksen
Dustin Didericksen
TOTAL:

Check Number(s)
1004, 1008, 1021, 1024,
1027, 1034, 1042, 1049,
1055
1007, 1018, 1023, 1028,
1047,
1016, 1029
1019
1062, 1066

Check Number(s)
1001
1006, 1035
1030

Amount

$47.500.00
$58,240.00
$7,975.00
$100,000.00
$6!000.00
$219,715.00
Amount
$1,014.38
$7,151.50

isoo.oo
$8,665.88

Check Number(s)
Counter Check

Other
Cash

Kamatsu Equipment·
Moulding & Sons
Key Bank
DOPL

1024, 102ts(.f~~v1*

GWF Inc.
Century 21 Elite
Wasatch Trailers

1098
1051
1041

TOTAL:
GRAND TOTAL

1012
1015
1017
-•

r

Amount
$100.00
$5,300.00
$4,080.00
$300.00
$615.00
$4,000.00
$7,500.00
$4!015.52
$25,910.52
$254,291.40
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ADDKNDUM TO SETTLEMENT AGREEl\tIENT AND RELEASE

TIIlS ADDENDUM TO SETTLElvIENT AGREEMENT A.ND RELEASE
("Addendum' is made and entered into by and among Kerry Posey and Bobbie Posey,
individuals (the "Poseys' Equity Partners, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and Four
Winds Development" Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, as the sole member and
manager of Equity Partners, LLC (collectiv.ely referred to as '~quity Partncrs Four Winds
Development Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, James Didericksen, as an individual
and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC, Allan Bruun, as an
individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC, and Guy
Anderson, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group,
LLC (collectively referred to as ''Four Winds''); and Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, Equity Partners, LLC as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, Kerry Posey, as
a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, Bpbbie Posey as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, and
Vladamir Canro, as an individual and as the manager of Tivoli Properties, LLC (collectively
referred to as ~'Tivoli"); and collectively referred to as the uParties".
1

)

1

);

11
);

The purpose for this Addendum is to clarify, amend, revise, and restate portions of the original
Settlement Agreement and Release executed by the Parties on or about November 12, 2008 (the
"Agreement''). All capitalized terms used herein, unless otherwise 9efined herein, shall have the
meanings set forth in the Agreement.
RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Parties entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release {the
"Agreement'1) on or about November 12, 2008; and
WHEREAS, prior to the time of executing the Agreement, Equity Partners had received
from the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT the amount of $174,000.00 (the "UDOT
Payment") and had conveyed to UDOT a portion of the Property (the "UDOT Parce1'
1

)

1

);

WHEREAS, the Parties desire hereby lo memorialize and fonnalize their agreement that
upon return by Equity Partners of the $174,000.00 as contemplated herein. all disputes and issues
between and among the Parties shall be settled and release in accordance with the terms of the
Agreement as modified and/or enlarged by the tenus of this Addendum.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein cootaine-d and in
order to further memorialize their reso]ution, settlement, and mut11al releases, the Parties hereby
enter into this Addendum upon the following terms and conditions: ·
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
l.
Escrow and Payment of UDOT Pavment: Upon execution of this Agreemen~
Equity Partner shall deliver to Premier Title (the uTitlc Company") tl1e amount of $174,000.00
in cash or certified funds, made payable to Premier Title as escrow agent.
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2.
Release ofUDOT Payment: The Poseys shall be solely responsible to obtain and
to deliver to the Title Company (a) evidence acceptable to Equity Partners and the Title
Company that Dry Creek Structures, LLC ("Dry Creekn) is the current holder of all interests
under the first and second notes and trust deeds affecting the Property 1; (b} good and sufficient
Partial Reconveyances of the UDOT Parcel from the effects of the First and Second Trust
Deeds, as defmed in Footnote No. I below.. fully authorized by Dry Creek ood executed by the
Title Company, as Trustee; (c) a written request from the Poseys authorizing the Title
Company to execute and record a Partial Reconveyaoce of the third trust deed 2, fully releasing
the UDOT Parcel from the effects of the Third Trust Deed, as defined in Footnote No. 2 below;
and (d) a Release of Personal Guaranties, fully executed by an authorized Manager or member
of Dry Creek, fully and unconditionally releasing Guy Anderson, Al1an Bruun, and James D.
Didericksen from their personal Guaranties associated with the First Note and Second Note.
Upon receipt by the Title Company of the foregoing, the Title Company shall be authorized and
directed to disperse the UDOT payment as instructed by written instructions executed by both
the Poseys lWQ Dry Creek.

Retention of the Settlement Pavment: The Parties acknowledge and agree that
3.
Equity Partners shall be entitled to retain the $25,000.00 payment received in accordance with
the Agreement.
4.
Settlement A!!reemeot Tenns Anplicable: Except as clarified, amended, and
revised herein, all of the terms and conditions contained in the Agreement, including, without
Hrnitation the provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement, are fully applicable to this
Addendum and are incorporated herein by this reference.
5.
Representations and Warranties: Equity Partners and Four Winds, and James
Didericksen, Guy Anderson and Allan Bruun as individuals and as members and managers of
Four Winds Development Group, LLC, hereby represent and warrant that no other TJDOT
Right of Way Contracts affecting the Property have been negotiated, signed or consummated
other than the one referencing Tax ID/Sidwell No:58-035-0030 with signature dates of
10/24/08, 10/29/08 and 10/31/08 for the Total Selling Price of $174,000 and relating to .59
acres of the Property.
6.
Counterparts and Execution bv Facsimile or Electronic Transmission: The Parties
agree that this Addendum may be executed in counterparts, with al1 counterparts, when taken
together, constituting one and the same instrument. To facilitate the execution and opening of
escrow on this matter, the Parties agree that this document may become effective upon receipt
by the Title Company of facsimile or email signatures of the Parties; provided, however, that
all Parties shall deliver to the Title Company original signatures to this Addendum, mailed to
the Title Company no later than the ~ate of signing by any such Party.
1The firsl nolc ("First Note") is a promissory note in the principal amount of$750,000.00 dilted November 20
1
1008. secured by n firsr priority trust deed {che "First Trust Deed") d3ted No,·ember 20, 2007 and recorded in the
Uu1h County Recorder's Office on November 21, 2007, ns Entry No. l 64448:2007. and the second note (the
..Second Note" is a promissory note in the principal amount of l 1,250.00 daled on or nbout November 20, 2007 and
recorded in the Utilh County Recorder's Office on November 21. 2007,. 3S Enny No. 16449:2007
:? The third trust deed {..Third Trust Deed .. ) is that certain Trust Deed dated November 16, 2007, and recorded in the
Utah County Recorder's Office on November 21. 2007, as EnrryNo. 164450:2007.
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IN WITh'ESS WHEREOF, the Parties pave executed or caused these presents to be
executed by their duly authorized officer, member, manager or representative as of the dates set
forth opposite each signature block or line.

Dated:_j........,.y
__2,_~__
/2)_g-_
EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC
A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT
GROUP,LLC

A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY CO.

e)
:Q.NU~
M aging Member of Four Winds
Development Group, LLC, its sole member
and manager

Dated:

4 aL

By.
Guy Anderson
Its: Managing Member

//frt/°8

FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT

FOUR WINDS DEVELOPMENT

GROUP,LLC

GROUP,LLC
A UTAH LIM]TED LIAB

A UTAH Lilv1ITED LIABILITY CO:M:PANY

ITY CO.

By:tlft~
A1lan Bruun

Its: Managing Member

Dated:

_,11_/t_r_/2_o_S_
~,

TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC
A UTAH LJMITED LIABILITY CO:MPA.l\ry

By.

.!lf ~

(Name) frttlfiO
/St2.UA/4/.I
Managing Member of Four Winds
Development Group, LLC, the sole member
And manager of Equity Partners, LLC, its
Member

Dated:

11 - /- ?op5{

TNOLIPROPERTIES, LLC
A UTAH LilvllTED LIABILITY CO.

Br-~£ A,~<

Ker{y Po y
Its: Member

Second Signature Page o/Settleme11t Agreement 011 Following Page
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Second Signature Page of Seltlement Agreement

Dated:

---------

TIVOLJPROPERTIES,LLC
A UTAH LilvIITED LIABILITY C01v1PANY

Br._r::::.~~::::!:::::::::::..J.!..~~:::::::;~
Bobbie Posey

Its: Member
Dated:

/J. - I -

Z &e, ~

:~~~=p~

Dated:

/1 - I/• -

o '(

TIVOLI PROPERTIES~ LLC
A UTAH LlMITED LIABILITY CO.

&ID,joj}_

By: .,
Vladimir Canro
Its: Manager

Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

:~~~p~

As an individual

As an individual

Dated: _ _/_t/:_z___,,t/_0_<3_ __

Dated:_/_/_/_£__
/

'

/

I
By:

l1f4i---

I

/4_~-~-

~

Allan Bruun
As an individual

Dated:

By:~d~
GuyAndeon

As an individual

/). -

II - o ~

J?C,vvi

By:
/0
Vladimir Canro
As an individual

4.{1_
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